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The Paradox of Financial Fire Sales: the Role of
Arbitrage Capital
JAMES DOW and JUNGSUK HAN*
Journal of Finance forthcoming
ABSTRACT
How can fire sales for financial assets happen when the economy contains well
capitalized, but non-specialist investors? Our explanation combines rational ex-
pectations equilibrium and “lemons” models. When specialist (informed) market
participants are liquidity-constrained, prices become less informative. This cre-
ates an adverse selection problem, decreasing the supply of high-quality assets,
and lowering valuations by non-specialist (uninformed) investors, who become un-
willing to supply capital to support the price. In normal times, arbitrage capital
can “multiply” itself by making uninformed capital function as informed capital,
but in a crisis this stabilizing mechanism fails.
In a fire sale, sellers are forced to sell assets at deep discounts because no one is willing to
buy them at fair prices. Sellers can be forced to sell because of financial distress, credit
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market frictions, regulation, margin calls, etc.1 Why do fire sales happen? What makes
investors avoid buying assets that are apparently cheap? One explanation is given by
Shleifer and Vishny (1992): if industry experts with higher private valuations do not
have enough liquidity, assets are bought at a discount by non-experts who cannot use
them efficiently. This argument applies naturally to real assets rather than financial
securities. But since financial securities typically require the holder only to collect cash
flows, not to operate the assets, there should not be significant differences in private
valuations.2
Allen and Gale (1994), Shleifer and Vishny (1997), Gromb and Vayanos (2002),
Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009), and Duffie (2010) give an alternative explanation
based on limited arbitrage capital. They argue that complex securities are normally held
by specialized investors who can understand them properly, so that if those investors
become severely capital constrained the available pool of specialized capital is too small
to pay full value for the outstanding stock of assets. It’s true that if all specialized
investors are capital constrained, then they are not able to buy undervalued assets.
But what about non-specialized investors? Many episodes described in the literature as
fire sales (such as the LTCM crisis and the collapse of the mortgage-backed securities
(MBS) markets during the financial crisis of 2007-2008) occurred even though there
were plenty of well-capitalized investors somewhere in the world economy (e.g., Warren
Buffett, or sovereign wealth funds). Why wouldn’t well-capitalized outside investors
want to step in and buy undervalued assets, thereby preventing large price drops? This
seems paradoxical.
A possible resolution of the paradox is based on “lemons” problems as described
by Akerlof (1970). Non-specialized investors could be exposed to adverse selection per-
petrated by industry insiders. This could happen if insiders choose to hold back high-
quality assets, and sell only low-quality assets, causing a classic lemons problem in which
anybody who is forced to sell high-quality assets would suffer a loss. But this explanation
has a major flaw because it does not explain why the lemons problem would suddenly in-
crease during a crisis. In a crisis, asset sellers should have less discretion on selling, thus,
liquidity shortages should even mitigate the lemons problem (e.g., Malherbe (2014)). It
1See, for example, Shleifer and Vishny (2011) for a survey.
2Some differences in valuation for financial securities do exist. For example, some holders are able
to repo the security and others are not. Also, expert investors may understand the risk of a security
better, allowing them to hedge their overall portfolio more effectively. However, these differences in
private valuations should be minor.
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seems that the paradox remains.
We give an intuitive answer to this question by examining the role of informed trading
in preventing adverse selection. We argue that informed traders who can buy assets
help to make market prices informative. This prevents high-quality assets from trading
at similar prices to low-quality assets. Hence, informed buyers remove the incentive
for sellers to sell low-quality assets. But in case of a large shock to the market, this
mechanism breaks down. A severe need for liquidity affecting specialized traders prevents
them from using their private information to bid up undervalued assets. This can make
prices uninformative, leading to adverse selection in which sellers predominantly supply
overvalued assets to the market. This in turn leads uninformed agents, who are potential
buyers for those assets, to withdraw from the market even though they are not wealth-
constrained. The result is a market freeze for high-quality assets: they are not traded,
except when their owners are subject to a severe liquidity shortage and therefore forced
to sell at fire sale prices.
To formalize this argument, we develop an information-based theory of fire sales using
a noisy rational expectations equilibrium (REE) framework with endogenous adverse
selection. We aim to achieve the following goals in our paper. First, we explain the role
of informed trading in fire sales and market freezes. Unlike the traditional literature on
adverse selection that only features informed sellers, we highlight the role of informed
traders who compete to exploit mispricing, and thereby make the price more informative.
Second, we answer the question of why fire sales occur even when, somewhere in the
economy, there are traders with enough capital to correct prices. In particular, we show
that a liquidity shortage for informed traders can deter the uninformed, well capitalized
traders from buying, thereby allowing asset prices to fall. This also sheds light on the
paradoxical nature of fire sales in which capital moves out of the market when it is
needed most and would seemingly earn higher returns. Third, we explain why a market
freeze happens at the same time as fire sales. That is, our paper explains the “double
whammy” situation where fire sales and low trading volume occur together (see, for
example, Tirole (2011) for a discussion of the financial crisis of 2007-2008).
Consider a two-period model with some participants who are informed, but finan-
cially constrained, and some who are unconstrained, but uninformed. There exists a
marketable asset with risky payoffs whose value is only known to the informed partici-
3
pants.3 There are two types of informed participants: a distressed seller who needs to
raise liquidity, and arbitrageurs who aim to make trading profits. The seller is forced to
meet liquidity needs, which he can do either by selling his holdings of the marketable
asset, or alternatively by liquidating another asset which is non-marketable (such as
profit-generating operations).4 This choice leads to the lemons problem; the seller only
sells the marketable asset when it is overvalued (a lemon), or when liquidating the non-
marketable asset is very costly. There are two types of uninformed participants: hedgers
and risk-neutral investors. Hedgers trade to hedge against their risk exposure which
is correlated with the payoff of the marketable asset. The randomness in hedgers’ risk
exposure creates trading noise which prevents full revelation of informed participants’
private information.
In normal market conditions where the arbitrageurs have enough liquidity, the price
reveals the fundamental value of the asset because informed trading volume overwhelms
the impact of noise. This allows the seller in liquidity shortage to fund itself by selling
the marketable asset at intrinsic value regardless of the quality of the asset. This in turn
makes uninformed investors willing to absorb the supply of asset without worrying about
adverse selection. On the other hand, in a crisis situation where the arbitrageurs are
liquidity-constrained, prices are less informative. This makes the seller willing to supply
only low-quality assets to the market, except in cases where it is effectively forced to
sell because the alternative of liquidating the non-marketable asset is very costly. This
adverse selection problem in turn makes uninformed investors unwilling to absorb the
supply of assets unless there is a drop in price to reflect a lemons discount. It also creates
a market freeze in the sense that the supply of high-quality assets decreases. In summary,
arbitrage capital can “multiply” itself by making uninformed capital effectively function
as informed capital in normal market, but this stabilizing mechanism can be undone
during a crisis.
An initial liquidity reduction to the arbitrageurs (modeled as a comparative statics
analysis where the amount of arbitrage capital is varied) decreases their capacity to
trade, so prices become less informative. This discourages the seller from selling high-
quality assets. This lemons problem causes prices to fall on average, further reinforcing
the seller’s reluctance to sell high-quality assets.
3In practice they are likely to be financial intermediaries such as banks and hedge funds.
4The non-marketable asset would produce low levels of output if it is liquidated early. Similar
assumptions are standard in the literature, for example, the assumption of illiquid assets held by banks
in Diamond and Dybvig (1983).
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We also show that economic welfare is maximized when prices are close to fundamen-
tal value. Intuitively, welfare depends on both expected total wealth and risk sharing.
On the expected total wealth side, mispricing causes inefficient liquidation of otherwise
valuable assets: in case traded assets are underpriced, the seller raises funds to meet
liquidity shortages by inefficiently liquidating non-marketable assets, rather than selling
traded assets. On the risk sharing side, market freezes accompanied by fire sales reduce
the hedgers’ expected utility by preventing them from hedging away their risk exposure.
Consequently, shortage in arbitrage capital can reduce economic welfare through fire
sales and market freezes.
It is worth noting that, in our model, the majority of the supply of the asset can
be absorbed by the uninformed investors rather than the informed arbitrageurs. Even
a small amount of informed capital is able to promote liquidity in the market as long as
it can make prices sufficiently informative. Informed capital facilitates the movement of
uninformed capital from markets with excess liquidity to those with low liquidity. This
potency of arbitrage capital, while apparently attractive, is however a double-edged
sword. A small reduction in informed capital can trigger fire sales and market freezes by
driving away the demand of uninformed investors. This implies that this “multiplier”
effect of arbitrage capital can actually serve as the source of financial instability rather
than financial stability.
Our model provides a useful tool for understanding fire-sale episodes, such as the
financial crisis of 2007-2008 during which many financial institutions were forced to
unwind their positions or to reduce leverage (See, for example, Brunnermeier (2009) and
Shleifer and Vishny (2011)). Our theory suggests how reductions in informed trading can
act as a transmission mechanism of liquidity shocks to fire sales in unrelated asset classes
such as the repo market (e.g., Gorton and Metrick (2012)) and residential mortgage-
backed securities (RMBS) (e.g., Merrill, Nadauld, Stulz, and Sherlund (2014)); it also
sheds light on market freezes such as the collapse of the non-agency RMBS market (e.g.,
Vickery and Wright (2013)).
The organization of the paper is as follows. Section I relates our paper to the lit-
erature. Section II describes the basic model. Section III solves for the equilibrium.
Section IV describes our main results about fire sales and market freezes. Section V
extend our baseline model by endogenizing arbitrageurs’ margin constraints. Section VI
studies implications of our paper about financial stability (including policy implication),
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and the financial crisis of 2007-2008. Section VII concludes.
I. Literature Review
There is a large literature on both the theory and the empirics of fire sales.5 On the
empirical side, there is evidence of fire sales across various classes of assets and securities:
(i) real assets (e.g., Pulvino (1998), Schlingemann, Stulz, and Walkling (2002)), (ii)
equities (e.g., Coval and Stafford (2007), Jotikasthira, Lundblad, and Ramadorai (2012)),
(iii) bonds (e.g., Ellul, Jotikasthira, and Lundblad (2011), Jotikasthira, Lundblad, and
Ramadorai (2012)), (iv) structured products (e.g., Merrill, Nadauld, Stulz, and Sherlund
(2014)), and (v) repos (e.g., Duarte and Eisenbach (2014)).
As discussed in the introduction, the previous theoretical literature suggests that
fire sales occur because of liquidity shocks to industry experts (e.g., Shleifer and Vishny
(1992)), and limits to arbitrage (e.g., Shleifer and Vishny (1997), Gromb and Vayanos
(2002), Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009)). Several papers also focus on the amplifi-
cation mechanism of fire sales as in Gromb and Vayanos (2002), Geanakoplos (2003),
Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009), Krishnamurthy (2010), Greenwood, Landier, and
Thesmar (2015), and Kuong (2015). For example, Krishnamurthy (2010) shows that
fire sales can occur due to feedback effects between asset prices and balance sheets.
Counterparty risk can also contribute to the amplification mechanism of fire sales (e.g.,
Krishnamurthy (2010), Caballero and Simsek (2013)). For example, Caballero and Sim-
sek (2013) study a model where fire sales occur because of counterparty risk in a complex
network. We agree with the main thrust of this literature that financial assets are typ-
ically held by specialized investors who help to set prices. But the explanations given
in the literature do not detail the economic mechanisms that prevent non-specialized
investors from trading the assets. For example, He and Krishnamurthy (2013) assume
they cannot participate, while in the learning model given in Duffie (2010) they first need
to become specialized, which takes time, before participating. Thus, we complement this
literature by explaining why and when nonspecialized investors will stay away.
In his seminal paper, Akerlof (1970) shows that a market collapse (or freeze) can
happen due to adverse selection. If the quality of assets is only known to sellers, assets
of different quality trade at the same price. This makes owners of high quality assets
5Shleifer and Vishny (2011) and Tirole (2011) provide surveys on the literature.
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withdraw from the market, and subsequently lowers buyers’ expectation about the qual-
ity, and this in turn makes more sellers withdraw from the market if they own assets with
the highest quality among the remaining sellers. This process can continue until there is
no seller left, thus the market collapses. This intuition has been extended and applied in
the finance literature. In particular, several papers have emphasized the role of fire sales
where sellers are forced to sell due to distress. However, buyers cannot tell whether the
supply is coming from liquidity-driven sales or information-driven sales, if other sellers
try to sell when they get bad signals. This type of adverse selection can be the source of a
market freeze.6 For example, Eisfeldt (2004) shows that market illiquidity endogenously
arises due to lemons problem in a dynamic consumption economy where agents trade
for both informational reasons and liquidity needs.7 Bolton, Santos, and Scheinkman
(2009) show that distressed sellers may choose to sell earlier at fire sale prices to avoid
potential adverse selection problems in the future. Dang, Gorton, and Holmstrom (2012)
suggest that a market freeze can occur in the debt market by extending the argument of
Myers and Majluf (1984). Although debt securities are information-insensitive relative
to equity, they become information sensitive when approaching a default state. This
causes increased information acquisition, but such information asymmetries may lead
to adverse selection and a market freeze. Malherbe (2014) focuses on the self-fulfilling
nature of liquidity dry-ups. If sellers are forced to sell their assets due to liquidity needs,
and do not choose to sell for informational reasons, adverse selection problems do not
arise. Because prices will not reflect adverse selection, sellers do not need to hoard liq-
uidity. On the other hand, if asset sales are driven by information, prices will reflect
adverse selection. Anticipating this, sellers will need to hoard liquidity. This creates
multiple equilibria.
Our theory is in stark contrast with existing theories of fire sales and market freezes.
Akerlof (1970) shows how a market freeze can happen in the presence of information
6Market illiquidity can also arise due to adverse selection in different contexts than distress: Daley
and Green (2012) show that information release can create a market freeze by creating delayed sales
of high-quality assets. Glode, Green, and Lowery (2012) show that financial intermediaries tend to
overinvest in expertise, thereby creating more information asymmetries which contribute to illiquidity
through adverse selection. Guerrieri and Shimer (2014) show that high-quality assets may be traded at
low frequencies to signal their types. Fishman and Parker (2015) show that buying only good assets
by early stage investors through more information acquisition leaves more bad assets to buy by later
stage, uninformed investors, thereby lowering asset prices on average. This price externality leads to
strategic complementarity creating multiple equilibria.
7Kurlat (2013) also shows that information asymmetries can amplify negative shocks in a dynamic
consumption economy through the channel of rising interest rates that in turn lower asset prices and
create further adverse selection problems.
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asymmetries. But, there is no informed trader who can correct market prices in that
argument. On the other hand, Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) show that the existence
of informed traders can improve the informativeness of prices, but the supply of assets
is inelastic to market prices. In our paper, Akerlof (1970) meets Grossman and Stiglitz
(1980), and this gives a mechanism that creates fire sales. This idea is illustrated in
Figure 1.
Informed sellers
Informed 
arbitrageurs
Noisy Rational Expectations Equilibrium
(e.g., Grossman and Stiglitz (1980))
Trading
Supply
Market for Lemons
(e.g., Akerlof (1970))
Uninformed 
investors
Uninformed 
hedgers (noise)
Figure 1. An illustration of our model. Akerlof (1970) meets Grossman and Stiglitz
(1980).
Our theory is different from Shleifer and Vishny (1992) because it does not require
private valuations. Our theory differs from Shleifer and Vishny (1997), Gromb and
Vayanos (2002), and Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009) because it does not rely on
exogenous exclusion of deep-pocketed investors (also, our model generates adverse se-
lection). Our theory differs from Malherbe (2014) because a market freeze (or fire sale)
occurs when informed traders are liquidity constrained. Specifically, Malherbe (2014)
argues that fire sales occur because of increased adverse selection. However, for this
argument to hold, traders should be only moderately distressed (i.e., more funding liq-
uidity for sellers) during fire sales so that they can choose to sell lemons instead of good
assets. Yet fire sales typically occur when traders are highly distressed.
Recent papers have extended the limits-to-arbitrage argument, and suggest that
“Slow-moving capital” could be a reason why fire sales still occur even when there
is enough capital in the economy (e.g., Mitchell, Pedersen, and Pulvino (2007), Duffie
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(2010)). However, it is hard to see why uninformed investors would be slow to buy under-
valued assets.8 What stops capital flowing to correct mispricing? Our paper contributes
to the discussion of slow-moving capital by suggesting that the presence of sufficient
informed capital can facilitate movement of uninformed capital. However, the market
can quickly become illiquid if informed capital providers are liquidity-constrained, as the
resulting lemons problem prevents entry of uninformed capital.
Our paper is also related to the literature on financial markets with intermediaries.
The usual setup is that only intermediaries participate in asset markets, thus, they trade
assets on behalf of consumers or outside investors (e.g., Shleifer and Vishny (1997),
Gromb and Vayanos (2002), Allen and Gale (2004), Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009),
He and Krishnamurthy (2011), He and Krishnamurthy (2013), Vayanos and Woolley
(2013), Dow and Han (2015)). The difference in the objectives of intermediaries and
delegating investors, which is often endogenously determined in the model, is the key to
generate mispricing or shock amplification in asset prices. For example, He and Krish-
namurthy (2011) and He and Krishnamurthy (2013) study dynamic general equilibrium
economies in which households, who do not have access to a long-lived risky asset, in-
vest in the equity of capital-constrained financial intermediaries (or specialists), who
have access to the risky asset. They show that shocks are amplified through the channel
of financial intermediation; as intermediary capital shrinks up to the point where their
capital constraint binds, risk premia of the risky asset rise. More generally in this line of
literature (e.g., Shleifer and Vishny (1997), Gromb and Vayanos (2002), Brunnermeier
and Pedersen (2009)), a negative shock to intermediary capital restricts investment by
outside investors and hence lowers asset prices. Our paper differs from this line of liter-
ature in three main respects. First, other models in this line of literature assume that
the marginal buyers are informed participants, while we allow the marginal buyer to be
determined endogenously in equilibrium—in contrast, it turns out to be the uninformed
participants. Second, we focus on how the interaction between informed capital and
uninformed capital determines liquidity in financial markets. We study why and how
uninformed traders endogenously inject or withdraw capital in response to reductions
in informed capital. This allows us to analyze the multiplier effect of informed capital
in financial markets. Third, the main mechanism of our model involves an endogenous
lemons problem resulting from the degree of informed trading activity. This creates a
8We accept that there are a small number of financial markets which are prohibited to unregulated
outside investors. For examples, only registered insurers can provide insurance.
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market freeze, which is typically absent in this line of literature, even though investors
have enough capital to absorb the asset supply in the market.
II. Model
A. Basic Setup
Consider a two-period economy (𝑡 = 1, 2) with a risk-free asset in infinitely elastic supply
with an exogenously-given return 𝑟𝑓 .
910 There is also a risky asset that is tradable by
all the participants in the financial market (henceforth, “the marketable asset”). The
marketable asset pays a random liquidation value of 𝑣 ≡ 𝜃 + 𝜖 at 𝑡 = 2. The first
component 𝜃 represents the “quality” of the asset which is given by
𝜃 =
{︃
𝜃𝐻 with probability 𝜌;
𝜃𝐿 with probability 1− 𝜌;
where 𝜃𝐻 > 𝜃𝐿 > 0 and 0 < 𝜌 < 1. We call the marketable asset a “high-quality” asset
in the event 𝜃 = 𝜃𝐻 , and “low-quality” otherwise. The second component 𝜖 is a residual
uncertainty which is either positive (𝜖) or negative (−𝜖) with equal probabilities.11 The
two components 𝜃 and 𝜖 are independent of each other, and the realization of 𝜃 is
observable to traders with expertise whereas that of 𝜖 is unobservable to anyone in the
economy. Examples of the marketable asset include most tradable financial securities
such as equities, corporate bonds, MBS, or CDO. For example, in the case of a fixed
income security such as corporate bond, one can interpret 𝜃𝐻 + 𝜖 as the promised payoff
(face value plus coupon) of the security, and other realizations as possible recovery values.
There are four classes of participants: (i) a seller, (ii) arbitrageurs, (iii) hedgers,
and (iv) investors. There is a unit mass of arbitrageurs, hedgers, and investors in the
economy. We denote 𝒜,ℋ, and ℐ to be the set of arbitrageurs, hedgers, and investors,
respectively. The seller and the arbitrageurs are capital-constrained, and informed about
9See Appendix A for a list of symbols used in this paper.
10The exogenous risk-free rate is a simplifying assumption, which is a standard assumption in noisy
rational expectations model. Endogenizing the risk-free rate by incorporating intertemporal consump-
tion would amplify shocks in the presence of adverse selection (e.g., Kurlat (2013)). Therefore, it could
possibly create an even greater magnitude of fire sales due to amplified shocks.
11The assumption that 𝜖 follows a Bernoulli distribution is for simplicity of exposition. It can generally
be replaced with any random variable with mean zero with a finite support.
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the quality of the marketable asset. On the other hand, the hedgers and the investors
are unconstrained and uninformed.
The seller participates to sell his endowment of the marketable asset to meet liquidity
needs. One can consider the seller to be a representative bank in the economy which
makes loans and sells securities made out of them.12 The seller is endowed with ?¯?
unit of the marketable asset. Besides the marketable asset, he is also endowed with a
“non-marketable asset” which cannot be traded or transferred to other participants. The
non-marketable asset can be considered as the profit-generating operations of the firm.13
The non-marketable asset generates a return 𝑦 per unit of investment with probability
density function 𝑓𝑦(·) and cumulative distribution function 𝐹𝑦(·) with support [𝑟𝑓 ,∞).
The seller’s liquidity shortage is given by 𝑙, and it can be met by either selling the
marketable asset or liquidating the non-marketable asset. For simplicity, we further
assume that the seller decides to sell either none or the entire holdings of the marketable
asset. Any remaining proceeds from selling the marketable asset can be reinvested in
the non-marketable asset. The seller can observe the realization of 𝜃 and 𝑦.
The arbitrageurs participate to generate profits by exploiting any mispricing by trad-
ing the asset. They are informed about the value of the marketable asset. Each arbi-
trageur 𝑎 ∈ 𝒜 has liquidity position 𝑤𝐴 which is strictly positive. One can interpret
𝑤𝐴 as the arbitrageurs’ cash position and available credit (e.g., cash from pledging their
inventory of other assets). As in the case of the sellers, the arbitrageurs observe the
realization of 𝜃. We assume that the arbitrageurs are subject to margin requirements.
In a similar fashion to Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009), we assume that arbitrageur
𝑎’s total margin on his position 𝑥𝑎 cannot exceed his available capital 𝑤𝐴:
|𝑚+𝑥𝑎,+|+ |𝑚−𝑥𝑎,−| ≤ 𝑤𝐴,
where 𝑚+ and 𝑚− is the dollar margin on the long and short position, and 𝑥𝑎,+ and
12Notice that there is only a single seller. The reason is as follows: In Akerlof’s lemons market for
used cars, each car could be of different quality, and hence in principle is a different good with its own
market and a single seller (i.e., the existing owner). Because there is no private information on the
buy-side of the market, all cars will trade at the same price, so it is possible to treat these different
markets as a single representative market. With private information among buyers, this is not possible.
Hence, in our model, we have a single market with a single seller.
13The non-marketability in this context is equivalent to assuming that cash flow from operations
cannot be also pledged to the full extent due to certain frictions such as moral hazard and information
asymmetries. Higher realized returns of the non-marketable asset represent the states of the world
where the seller is forced to raise liquidity by selling even a high-quality asset even at cheaper prices.
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𝑥𝑎,− are the positive and negative part of arbitrageur 𝑎’s position in units of the asset
(i.e., 𝑥𝑎 = 𝑥𝑎,+ + 𝑥𝑎,−). The dollar margins 𝑚+,𝑚− are exogenously-given parameters,
but are endogenized later in Section V.
The hedgers participate to hedge their non-tradable risk exposure that is correlated
with the payoff of the marketable asset. Such hedging needs may arise from a common
risk factor that affects both the future wealth of a hedger (such as their labor income)
and the payoff of the marketable asset.14 We assume that 𝜂 portion of hedgers are
affected by a wealth shock (thus, 1 − 𝜂 portion of hedgers are unaffected by it) where
𝜂 is a random variable that follows a probability distribution with probability density
function 𝑓𝜂(·) with support on [0, 1]. Each hedger ℎ observes his own individual wealth
shock of 𝑣𝑧ℎ where 𝑧ℎ = −𝑧 < 0 if he is affected, and 𝑧ℎ = 0 otherwise. The hedgers
are unconstrained and have an identical constant absolute risk aversion (CARA) utility
with a risk aversion parameter 𝛾.
The investors participate to transfer their liquidity to the future, and also potentially
to make trading profits. They are risk-neutral, and unconstrained in their capacity to
invest in available investment opportunities. The arbitrageurs and the hedgers submit
demand schedule conditioning on prices. The investors observe the aggregate order flows
and set the price that clears the market. This is equivalent to assuming that there exists
an auctioneer who finds market clearing prices given demand schedules of all market
participants including the investors.15 The hedgers and the investors are uninformed
about the realization of 𝜃, but in equilibrium they will learn about it from the price of
the marketable asset.
Intuitively, the seller can be considered to be a firm that invests in projects and
creates financial securities. A bank that originates and distributes loans is an example.
If the bank writes down some assets in its balance sheet, capital requirements force it to
either shrink its balance sheet (by selling assets) or raise capital. The arbitrageurs are
firms that specialize in securities trading and have particular expertise in trading the
marketable asset but have limited capital. In practice such investors are typically firms
rather than individuals. Examples include investment banks that specialize in market-
making, hedge funds that specialize in investing in the marketable asset and similar
14We assume that the wealth shock is perfectly negatively correlated with the payoff of the marketable
asset for simplicity. The results are qualitatively unaffected by the assumption of a partial and positive
correlation.
15See, for example, Vives (1995) for a further discussion on this equivalence.
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assets, etc. Such arbitrageurs can be subject to liquidity constraints in the form of
regulatory requirements, margin calls, client capital withdrawals, etc. Elsewhere in the
economy, capital is not limited but the investors deploying this capital have no expertise
in the tradable asset. Such investors could be pension funds, insurance companies,
financial institutions in other countries, sovereign wealth funds, wealthy investors like
Warren Buffett, etc—in other words, any investors who do not have particular expertise
in valuing and trading the marketable asset. A more conceptual interpretation is that
the investors and the hedgers are the “representative consumer” of the economy who,
although he may choose to hold assets via intermediaries, has the option of investing
directly.
The market opens if the seller decides to sell his holdings of the marketable asset.
If there is no supply of the marketable asset from the seller, the market does not open.
Once the market is open, arbitrageurs and investors then condition their demands on
the price. The market clears by equating the supply of the seller to the demand from
the other traders (arbitrageurs, hedgers, and investors). We assume that the hedgers
cannot open the market by themselves unlike the seller because they are infinitesimal.
B. Optimization Problems
The seller maximizes future expected profit by deciding whether to sell his endowment
of marketable asset or liquidate the non-marketable asset. We denote 𝑥𝑠 to be the units
of marketable asset sold by the seller. Then, the seller solves an optimal trading problem
given 𝜃 and 𝑦:
max
𝑥𝑠∈{0,?¯?}
𝐸
[︀
𝑣(?¯?− 𝑥𝑠) + (1 + 𝑦)(𝑝𝑥𝑠 − 𝑙)⃒⃒𝜃, 𝑦]︀, (1)
where 𝑙 is the size of liquidity shortage.16
Each arbitrageur 𝑎 ∈ 𝒜 maximizes expected trading profit by choosing a portfolio of
the marketable asset and the risk-free asset under the liquidity constraint. Arbitrageur
𝑎 solves the following constrained optimization problem given 𝜃 and 𝑝:
max
𝑥𝑎
𝐸
[︀
𝑣𝑥𝑎 + (1 + 𝑟𝑓 )(𝑤𝐴 − 𝑝𝑥𝑎)|𝜃, 𝑝
]︀
,
16Notice that the seller’s objective function is independent of 𝑙 because the non-marketable asset has
constant returns to scale.
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subject to
|𝑚+𝑥𝑎,+|+ |𝑚−𝑥𝑎,−| ≤ 𝑤𝐴, (2)
where equation (2) is the margin constraint.
Each hedger ℎ ∈ ℋ maximizes expected utility of future wealth by choosing a port-
folio that consists of the marketable asset and the risk-free asset. Investor 𝑖 solves the
following optimization problem given the price 𝑝 and the wealth shock 𝑧ℎ:
max
𝑥ℎ
𝐸
[︂
−1
𝛾
exp
(︁
−𝛾[︀𝑤𝐻(1 + 𝑟𝑓 ) + (𝑣 − 𝑝(1 + 𝑟𝑓 ))𝑥ℎ + 𝑣𝑧ℎ]︀)︁⃒⃒⃒𝑝, 𝑧ℎ]︂,
where 𝑧ℎ = −𝑧 if hedger ℎ receives the wealth shock, and 𝑧ℎ = 0 otherwise.
III. Equilibrium
A. Definition of Equilibrium
Equilibrium is defined in a standard manner for noisy rational expectations equilibrium
models with a mass of risk-neutral uninformed investors (e.g., Vives (1995), Dow and
Rahi (2000), Dow and Rahi (2003)): competitive market participants (arbitrageurs and
hedgers) submit orders conditioning on prices; risk-neutral, competitive investors set
prices to clear the market conditioning on the net supply of the asset (they are analogous
to market makers in Kyle (1985) model).
DEFINITION 1: An equilibrium is a price 𝑝, the supply of the marketable asset 𝑥𝑠, and
trades
(︀
(𝑥𝑎)𝑎∈𝒜, (𝑥ℎ)ℎ∈ℋ
)︀
such that (i) 𝑥𝑠 solves the seller’s problem, (ii) 𝑥𝑎 solves each
arbitrageur 𝑎’s problem, (iii) 𝑥ℎ solves each hedger ℎ’s problem, (iv) the net supply to
the investors is given by
𝑋 ≡ 𝑥𝑠 −
∫︁
ℎ∈ℋ
𝑥ℎ𝑑ℎ−
∫︁
𝑎∈𝒜
𝑥𝑎𝑑𝑎,
and (v) the price satisfies
𝑝 =
1
1 + 𝑟𝑓
𝐸
[︀
𝑣
⃒⃒
𝑝,𝑋
]︀
. (3)
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We define a market freeze to be a situation in which the market fails to open with a
positive probability because the seller may sometimes prefer not to sell the marketable
asset. Define
𝜇𝐻 ≡ 𝑃𝑟
(︁
𝑥𝑠 > 0
⃒⃒⃒
𝜃𝐻
)︁
;
𝜇𝐿 ≡ 𝑃𝑟
(︁
𝑥𝑠 > 0
⃒⃒⃒
𝜃𝐿
)︁
.
Because the low-quality asset is circulated in the market with probability one, 𝜇𝐻
can be also interpreted as the relative circulation rate of the high-quality asset to that
of the low-quality asset.
DEFINITION 2: There is a market freeze if the high-quality asset fails to fully circulate
in the market, that is, 𝜇𝐻 < 1.
We define a fire sale to be an event in which the seller sells his holdings at a price so
that he would never want to sell unless he is forced to sell for non-informational reasons
(such as liquidity shortage).
DEFINITION 3: The seller engages in a fire sale if he sells his holdings of the high-
quality asset at a discount rate greater than the risk-free rate, that is, 𝑥𝑠 > 0 when
𝐸[𝑝|𝜃𝐻 ] < 𝐸[𝑣|𝜃𝐻 ]1+𝑟𝑓 .
The intuition behind these definitions is as follows. Since sellers are informed, one
could conjecture that they will normally sell overvalued assets and not sell undervalued
assets. Hence, a seller who sells an undervalued asset must be trying to raise cash, not
selling for informational reasons. We call this a fire sale. When prices are lower than
𝐸[𝑣|𝜃𝐻 ]
1+𝑟𝑓
, the seller would not want to sell unless the realization of 𝑦 is high enough that he
wants to sell the apparently-undervalued high-quality asset, so as not to give up more
profitable non-marketable asset.
Turning to the volume of sales, it may seem natural in this model for the seller to
always sell his holdings because the returns on the non-marketable asset dominate the
returns required by the investors (i.e., 𝑦 is greater than or equal to 𝑟𝑓 ). So, if the seller
is keeping back his holdings from the market, this suggests that there is some kind of
malfunction in the market. As we will show, it is impossible for the marketable asset to
trade in equilibrium at less than the present value of the low-quality asset. This implies
that the seller will always sell the low-quality asset. But if the price is not revealing, the
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seller may hold back the high-quality asset for classic lemons motives. This is what we
describe as a market freeze.
B. Solving for Equilibrium
B.1. Demand and Supply
We first describe the seller’s supply of the marketable asset given the value of the mar-
ketable asset and the return on the non-marketable asset. The following is immediate
from the seller’s problem (1):
LEMMA 1: Given 𝜃 and 𝑦, the seller’s supply is as follows:17
𝑥𝑠 ∈
{︃
0 if 𝐸[𝑝|𝜃] < 𝐸[𝑣|𝜃]
1+𝑦
;
?¯? if 𝐸[𝑝|𝜃] ≥ 𝐸[𝑣|𝜃]
1+𝑦
.
The seller sells his holdings of the marketable asset if the expected price exceeds the
value of the asset, discounted at the opportunity cost of capital. (This is the seller’s
return on the non-marketable asset, since we have assumed that it is higher than or equal
to the risk-free rate.) In other words, when the non-marketable asset has a high return,
the seller will sell his endowment of the marketable asset to meet liquidity needs. When
the non-marketable asset has a low return, the seller will instead meet his liquidity needs
by liquidating the non-marketable asset.
Once the market opens the arbitrageurs, hedgers, and investors trade with the seller.
Equation (3) implies that a high-quality asset are never undervalued whereas a low-
quality asset are never undervalued. Therefore, arbitrageurs are always willing to buy a
high-quality asset, and sell a low-quality asset:
17We assume a tie-breaking rule that the seller chooses to sell in case the seller is indifferent between
choices. This assumption is purely to simplify exposition, and does not affect the result. The other
possible tie-breaking rule (i.e., not selling his holdings when indifferent) results in an identical outcome
because it is a measure-zero event.
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LEMMA 2: The arbitrageurs’ aggregate order flow, 𝑋𝐴 ≡
∫︀
𝑎∈𝒜 𝑥
𝑎𝑑𝑎, is as follows:18
𝑋𝐴 ∈
{︃
𝑤𝐴
𝑚+
if 𝜃 = 𝜃𝐻 ;
− 𝑤𝐴
𝑚− if 𝜃 = 𝜃𝐿.
For notational convenience, we denote 𝑋𝐴(𝜃) to be arbitrageurs’ aggregate order
flows given 𝜃 because it effectively depends only on 𝜃.
Each hedger observes his own wealth shock, then participate in trading at the market.
We get the following aggregate order flow of the hedgers:
LEMMA 3: The hedgers’ aggregate order flow, 𝑋𝐻 ≡
∫︀
ℎ∈ℋ 𝑥
ℎ𝑑ℎ, is given by
𝑋𝐻 = 𝑋
𝐶𝐴𝑅𝐴(𝑝) + 𝜂𝑧,
where 𝑋𝐶𝐴𝑅𝐴(𝑝) is a function of 𝑝 which is independent of 𝜂.
Proof: See Appendix B. Q.E.D.
The first component is a standard CARA demand function given 𝑝, and the second
component is the aggregate hedging needs of those hedgers who are affected by the
wealth shock negatively correlated with the payoff of the marketable asset. Each hedger
attempts to infer 𝜃 from the market clearing price 𝑝, thus, the demand of the asset is
based on their posterior belief. As we will show in the next section, there is no speculative
trading benefit under the equilibrium price in equation (3), thus, the first component
becomes zero.
B.2. Learning
Lemma 1 implies that the probability of the market opening for the high- and the low-
quality asset, respectively, is given by:
𝜇𝐻 = 1− 𝐹𝑦
(︁ 𝜃𝐻
𝐸[𝑝|𝜃𝐻 ] − 1
)︁
, (4)
𝜇𝐿 = 1. (5)
18As in the supply of the seller, we assume a tie-breaking rule that the arbitrageurs choose to buy a
good asset and sell in case they are indifferent between choices.
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Because the market is less likely to be open for the high-quality asset relative to
the low-quality asset, the fact that the investors are participating in the market delivers
some information about the quality of the traded asset. Conditional on the market being
open, the investors’ probability assessment that the asset is of high quality is given by19
𝜌 ≡ 𝑃𝑟(𝜃 = 𝜃𝐻 |𝑥𝑠 > 0) = 𝜌𝜇𝐻
𝜌𝜇𝐻 + (1− 𝜌) . (7)
Uninformed agents (i.e., hedgers and investors) assess that the quality of the traded
asset is likely to be poorer when they expect a greater undervaluation for the high-
quality asset (i.e., 𝐸[𝑝|𝜃𝐻 ] is lower). This reflects the classic lemons intuition that good
assets are in smaller supply than lemons. This adverse selection problem becomes more
severe as prices become more dislocated. Therefore, uninformed agents’ prior belief of
the quality of the asset being high is adjusted to be 𝜌 rather than 𝜌.
Unlike the seller who influences the average quality of the traded asset, arbitrageurs
influence the informativeness of prices and trading volumes. Arbitrageurs’ order flow,
𝑋𝐴(𝜃), partially reveal the quality of the traded asset, 𝜃, due to the existence of noise,
𝜂𝑧, in the net supply. That is, the investors infer a noisy signal, 𝜉 ≡ 𝑋𝐴(𝜃) + 𝜂𝑧, which
is a sufficient statistic for the net supply 𝜉, then update their belief about 𝜃 using Bayes’
rule:20
LEMMA 4: Given the prior belief 𝜌, the investors’ posterior belief that the traded asset
is of a high quality conditional on 𝜉 is given by
𝑞(𝜉) =
{︃
𝜌𝑓𝜂(𝜂)
𝜌𝑓𝜂(𝜂)+(1−𝜌)𝑓𝜂(𝜂+Δ𝑋/𝑧) ; if 𝜃 = 𝜃𝐻 ;
𝜌𝑓𝜂(𝜂−Δ𝑋/𝑧)
𝜌𝑓𝜂(𝜂−Δ𝑋/𝑧)+(1−𝜌)𝑓𝜂(𝜂) ; if 𝜃 = 𝜃𝐿,
where Δ𝑋 is the maximum difference in the information component of net supply for
19Using Bayes’ rule, we have
𝑃𝑟(𝜃 = 𝜃𝐻 |𝑥𝑠 > 0) = 𝜌𝑃𝑟(𝑥
𝑠 > 0|𝜃 = 𝜃𝐻)
𝜌𝑃𝑟(𝑥𝑠 > 0|𝜃 = 𝜃𝐻) + (1− 𝜌)𝑃𝑟(𝑥𝑠 > 0|𝜃 = 𝜃𝐿) . (6)
Then, equation (7) is immediate from equation (6) because 𝑃𝑟(𝑥𝑠 > 0|𝜃 = 𝜃𝐻) = 1 − 𝐹𝑦
(︀
𝜃𝐻
𝐸[𝑝|𝜃𝐻 ] − 1
)︀
and 𝑃𝑟(𝑥𝑠 > 0|𝜃 = 𝜃𝐿) = 1.
20Notice that the hedgers also share the same posterior belief as the investors because they can infer
the investors’ posterior belief from the price given in equation (3)
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the high- and low- quality assets:
Δ𝑋 ≡ 𝑋𝐴(𝜃𝐻)−𝑋𝐴(𝜃𝐿) = 𝑤𝐴
𝑚+
+
𝑤𝐴
𝑚−
.
Proof: See Appendix B. Q.E.D.
When the arbitrageurs have more capital (or liquidity), net supply reveals funda-
mental value better. Because Δ𝑋 measures the variability in the net supply due to
arbitrage activities, we call it the “arbitrage trading variation.” Lemma 4 implies that
the investors’ posterior belief becomes more accurate with a greater Δ𝑋; higher arbi-
trage trading variation generally increases the chance of revealing the fundamental value
of the marketable asset. Because the noise in the supply, 𝜂𝑧, has bounded support, prices
will fully reveal the quality of the traded asset when arbitrage trading variation, Δ𝑋, is
sufficiently large. As Δ𝑋 increases, 𝑞(𝜉) tends to approach one if 𝜃 = 𝜃𝐻 , and tends to
approach zero if 𝜃 = 𝜃𝐿.
Figure 2 illustrates this. When arbitrage trading variation, Δ𝑋, is large as in Fig-
ure 2.(a), any realization of 𝜉 will not overlap between the two cases with 𝜃𝐻 and 𝜃𝐿.
On the other hand, when arbitrage trading variation is small as in Figure 2.(b), a large
portion of realizations of 𝜉 are likely to overlap between the two cases with 𝜃𝐻 and 𝜃𝐿.
This results in a noisier price.
B.3. Equilibrium
The following proposition shows that the model always has an equilibrium, and also
provides its characteristics as well as its uniqueness condition:
PROPOSITION 1: (i) (Existence of equilibrium) There always exists an equilibrium,
that is, there exists an average asset quality of the traded asset 𝜌 ∈ (0, 𝜌] that satisfies
𝜌 = 𝐻(𝜌), (8)
where
𝐻(𝜌) ≡
𝜌
(︀
1− 𝐹𝑦
(︀
𝜃𝐻
𝐸[𝑝(𝜃,𝜂;𝜌)|𝜃𝐻 ] − 1
)︀)︀
𝜌
(︀
1− 𝐹𝑦
(︀
𝜃𝐻
𝐸[𝑝(𝜃,𝜂;𝜌)|𝜃𝐻 ] − 1
)︀)︀
+ (1− 𝜌) .
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Figure 2. An illustration of price informativeness. This figure depicts the degree
of price informativeness under large and small arbitrage trading variation given 𝜉 ≡
𝑋𝐴(𝜃) + 𝜂𝑧 which is a sufficient statistic for net supply 𝑋.
The equilibrium price 𝑝 given 𝜃, 𝜂 and 𝜌 is given by
𝑝(𝜃, 𝜂; 𝜌) =
1
1 + 𝑟𝑓
(︀
𝑞(𝜃, 𝜂; 𝜌)𝜃𝐻 + (1− 𝑞(𝜃, 𝜂; 𝜌))𝜃𝐿
)︀
, (9)
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with the weight 𝑞(𝜃, 𝜂; 𝜌) such that
𝑞(𝜃𝐻 , 𝜂; 𝜌) ≡ 𝜌𝑓𝜂(𝜂)
𝜌𝑓𝜂(𝜂) + (1− 𝜌)𝑓𝜂(𝜂 +Δ𝑋/𝑧) ; (10)
𝑞(𝜃𝐿, 𝜂; 𝜌) ≡ 𝜌𝑓𝜂(𝜂 −Δ𝑋/𝑧)
𝜌𝑓𝜂(𝜂 −Δ𝑋/𝑧) + (1− 𝜌)𝑓𝜂(𝜂) . (11)
(ii) (Uniqueness of equilibrium) The equilibrium is unique if (a) 𝐻 ′(𝜌) < 1 if 𝐻(𝜌) = 𝜌,
and (b) 𝐻 ′′(𝜌) ≥ 0 for all 𝜌 ∈ [𝜌′, 𝜌] if 𝐻 ′′(𝜌′) > 0.
Proof: See Appendix B. Q.E.D.
Proposition 1.(i) shows existence of equilibrium by proving that there exists a fixed
point for 𝜌 that solves equation (8). Proposition 1.(ii) provides a sufficient condition
for uniqueness of equilibrium that depends on the distribution of 𝑦 and 𝜂. It is well
known that the market for lemons can generally have multiple equilibria (e.g., Wilson
(1979, 1980)). When low prices are expected, the seller is less inclined to sell a high
quality asset, thereby lowering prices even further. This feedback effect may result in
self-fulfilling prophecy that creates multiple equilibria.
A complete characterization of the set of necessary and sufficient conditions under
which equilibrium is unique is beyond the scope of the paper. However, we need to
address the question of uniqueness, since we will provide figures illustrating comparative
statics of our model, based on numerical calculations of equilibrium. For these compar-
ative statics to be more convincing, we should check that the equilibrium is unique in
these calculations. The conditions in part (ii) of the propositions can easily be checked,
so they allow us to verify this. Conditions (a) and (b) together rule out coexistence of
two fixed points either on the interior or at the corner 𝜌 = 𝜌. Condition (a) rules out
the possibility of a corner fixed point at 𝜌 = 𝜌 with a slope of 𝐻(·) greater than or equal
to one. Condition (b) makes sure that 𝐻(·) does not become concave for higher values
of 𝜌 once it was convex for lower values of 𝜌.21 All the comparative statics presented in
this paper satisfy these sufficient conditions for uniqueness.
21For example, any concave function or any convex function satisfy condition (b). Also, any function
which is concave for lower values, but convex for higher values satisfies it.
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IV. Main Results
A. Fire Sales and Market Freezes
In this subsection, we show that fire sales and market freezes can occur due to reductions
in the arbitrageurs’ capital. When the arbitrageurs have enough capital, we find that
there is no price dislocation. Intuitively, uninformed investors are willing to provide
liquidity and supply capital to buy the asset at normal prices. In that case, the seller
always sells his holdings of the marketable asset rather than giving up on their profitable
non-marketable assets. Therefore, the supply of the marketable asset is insensitive to
the quality of the asset, and is driven only by the liquidity needs of the seller.
On the other hand, in case arbitrageurs’ capital is scarce, prices are dislocated.
Intuitively, uninformed investors are not willing to provide liquidity at normal prices,
but, they are only willing to supply capital to buy the asset at a fire sale price. In that
case, seller’s decisions depend on the asset quality. If the marketable asset is of low
quality, he sells it. However, if the marketable asset is of high quality, he only sells it
when divesting from the non-marketable asset is very costly. Therefore, average asset
quality per trading volume goes down. This deterioration of average asset quality further
depresses prices, thereby creating fire sales in case seller has to sell. To summarize, the
reduction in arbitrageurs’ capital leads to uninformative prices, which in turn cause
further price drops through adverse selection. This idea is illustrated in Figure 3.
We now state our main results about fire sales and market freezes.
PROPOSITION 2: (i) (Fire sales) fire sales occur if and only if arbitrage capital is below
?¯?𝐴 ≡ 𝑧
(︁
𝑚+𝑚−
𝑚++𝑚−
)︁
, that is,
𝐸[𝑝|𝜃𝐻 ] ∈
{︃ {︀
𝜃𝐻
1+𝑟𝑓
}︀
if 𝑤𝐴 ≥ ?¯?𝐴;
[ 𝜃𝐿
1+𝑟𝑓
, 𝜃𝐻
1+𝑟𝑓
) if 𝑤𝐴 < ?¯?𝐴,
(ii) (Lemons problem) the average quality of the traded asset becomes poorer if and only
if arbitrage capital is below ?¯?𝐴, that is,
𝜌 ∈
{︃
{𝜌} if 𝑤𝐴 ≥ ?¯?𝐴;
[0, 𝜌) if 𝑤𝐴 < ?¯?𝐴.
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Figure 3. An illustration of endogenous lemons problem. This figure depicts
how a crisis causes a lemons problem.
Proof: See Appendix B. Q.E.D.
Proposition 2 shows that there is neither a fire sale nor a market freeze when there is
enough capital for the arbitrageurs. ?¯?𝐴 is the level of arbitrage capital that eliminates
the possibility of any fire sale or market freeze. We call this level of arbitrage capital
the “fire-sale-free” level. On the other hand, insufficient arbitrage capital can create
a double whammy of fire sales and market freezes. In case of the high-quality asset,
a reduction in arbitrage capital creates a large price reduction because it affects both
supply and demand. That is, the investors are less willing to absorb the net supply at
any given level of prices.
Why do trades of high-quality assets shrink so much when there is a reduction in
arbitrage capital? Answering this question is the main purpose of our analysis in this
subsection. Consider the expected price at which a good quality asset can be sold. Then,
a reduction in arbitrage capital has both a direct effect and an indirect effect that reduce
demand, thereby precipitating price falls.
The direct effect, which we call the “price informativeness effect”, is related to price
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dislocation. This effect is captured by our noisy REE framework that connects price
informativeness to informed trading. The reduction of arbitrage capital creates an initial
price fall for high-quality assets because the investors cannot infer the quality of the
traded asset as much as before.
The indirect effect, which we call the “adverse selection effect”, is related to feedback
effects between price dislocation and the lemons problem. When prices are noisy, the
seller will not sell the high-quality asset unless they are effectively forced by very press-
ing liquidity needs (i.e., high liquidation costs for the non-marketable asset). That is,
the initial price dislocation due to uninformative prices (i.e., the direct effect) worsens
adverse selection of the seller, thereby lowering the average quality of the traded asset
poorer. Because the average quality gets poorer, prices fall further, but this in turn low-
ers the quality further by worsening the adverse selection problem, and so on. Therefore,
price becomes more dislocated as the overall quality of traded assets becomes poorer.
This feedback mechanism causes the “double whammy” of a large fire sale discount and
a market freeze for the high-quality asset.
When arbitrage capital is reduced from ?¯?𝐴 to 𝑤
′
𝐴, the fire sale discount (or the
change in prices) can be decomposed into two components as follows:
𝐸[𝑣|𝜃𝐻 ]
1 + 𝑟𝑓
− 𝐸[𝑝′|𝜃𝐻 ]⏟  ⏞  
fire sale discount
= 𝐸
[︁(𝜃𝐻 − 𝜃𝐿)
1 + 𝑟𝑓
(︁
𝑞(𝜃𝐻 , 𝜂; 𝜌, ?¯?𝐴)− 𝑞(𝜃𝐻 , 𝜂; 𝜌, 𝑤′𝐴)
)︁]︁
⏟  ⏞  
price informativeness effect
+ 𝐸
[︁(𝜃𝐻 − 𝜃𝐿)
1 + 𝑟𝑓
(︁
𝑞(𝜃𝐻 , 𝜂; 𝜌, 𝑤
′
𝐴)− 𝑞(𝜃𝐻 , 𝜂; 𝜌′, 𝑤′𝐴)
)︁]︁
⏟  ⏞  
adverse selection effect
,
where 𝑞(𝜃𝐻 , 𝜂; 𝜌, 𝑤𝐴) is the value of the weight 𝑞(𝜃𝐻 , 𝜂; 𝜌) at the given level of 𝑤𝐴, and
𝐸[𝑝′|𝜃𝐻 ] and 𝜌′ are the expected price of the high-quality asset and the average quality
of the traded assets given 𝑤′𝐴, respectively.
This idea is illustrated in Figure 4. The “demand” shown in Figure 4 can be viewed
as an inverse demand curve as follows. For a given quantity offered for sale to the
uninformed investors, the curve shows the price at which they are willing to buy that
amount. Because the uninformed investors are risk-neutral and are making inferences
from the quantity (net supply), this “inverse demand” interpretation is more appropriate
than the usual “demand” interpretation as a quantity that will be bought by investors
at a given price. First consider an equilibrium prior to the reduction in arbitrage capital.
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Figure 4. Price informativeness effect vs. adverse selection effect. This figure
depicts fire sales of the high-quality asset.
The equilibrium is determined at point 𝐴 where demand and supply are matched given
the initial size of arbitrage capital. Now, suppose that there is a reduction in arbitrage
capital, and this shifts the supply curve outward. Because the shock to arbitrage capital
is common knowledge among all participants, the investors incorporate that information,
thus, their demand shifts outward to accommodate the change. However, the demand
will not shift enough to support the same price as at point 𝐴 because prices are now
less revealing. Therefore, the price will be lowered to point 𝐵. This in turn results
in a further decrease in prices through the lemons problem. That is, the reduction
in arbitrage capital lowers price informativeness, thus, this increases adverse selection.
Therefore, demand shrinks as a result of the increased lemons problem. As a result of
the decrease in demand, the equilibrium is determined at point 𝐶 rather than 𝐵.
For numerical examples, we choose the following parameter values unless stated
otherwise: 𝜃𝐻 = 1, 𝜃𝐿 = 0.3, 𝜌 = 0.8, 𝜖 = 1, ?¯? = 1,𝑚
+ = 𝑚− = 1, 𝛾 = 1, 𝑧 = 2, 𝑟𝑓 = 0.
We also assume that 𝜂 follows a beta distribution with shape parameters 𝛼𝜂 = 2 and
𝛽𝜂 = 2, and 𝑦 ≡ 𝑦 − 𝑟𝑓 , which is the excess return of the non-marketable asset over the
risk-free rate, follows a log-normal distribution with location parameter 𝜇𝑦 = −5 and
scale parameter 𝜎𝑦 = 1.8.
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Figure 5 illustrates the impact of a reduction in arbitrage capital on the expected
price and the average quality of the traded asset in case of the high-quality asset. When
22The probability density function of 𝜂 given parameters 𝛼 and 𝛽 is given by
𝑓𝜂(𝜂;𝛼, 𝛽) =
𝜂𝛼𝜂−1(1− 𝜂)𝛽𝜂−1∫︀ 1
0
𝜂𝛼𝜂−1(1− 𝜂)𝛽𝜂−1𝑑𝑢
, for all [0, 1];
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(a) Expected price of high-quality asset (𝐸[𝑝|𝜃𝐻 ]) (b) Average quality of traded asset (𝜌)
Figure 5. Comparative statics. This figure depicts the impact of a reduction in
arbitrage capital on the expected price of the high-quality asset and the average quality
of the traded asset (the x-axis is scaled as the percentage of ?¯?𝐴).
there is enough arbitrage capital, the marketable asset is in full supply and price ap-
proaches fundamental value. As arbitrage capital falls, however, the fire sale discount
increases (see the left panel of Figure 5). Also, the average quality of the traded asset
falls because the supply of the high-quality asset decreases (see the right panel of Fig-
ure 5). That is, market freezes and fire sales occur together due to adverse selection.
Furthermore, notice that the increase in the fire sale discount starts accelerating due to
the adverse selection effect even for a relatively small reduction in arbitrage capital (i.e.,
where 𝑤𝐴
?¯?𝐴
≈ 90%).
The left panel of Figure 6 illustrates the impact of a reduction in arbitrage capital
on the circulation rates of the high- and low- quality asset, respectively. When there is
enough arbitrage capital, the seller sells the marketable asset regardless of its quality
(i.e., 𝜇𝐻 = 𝜇𝐿 = 1). When there is a reduction in arbitrage capital, however, the seller
is more likely to sell lemons rather than the high-quality asset (i.e., 𝜇𝐻 < 1 and 𝜇𝐿 = 1).
The right panel of Figure 6 illustrates the impact of a reduction in arbitrage capital
and that of 𝑦 given parameter 𝜇𝑦, 𝜎𝑦 is given by
𝑓𝑦(𝑦;𝜇𝑦, 𝜎𝑦) =
1
𝑦𝜎𝑦
√
2𝜋
exp
(︃
−
(︀
log(𝑦)− 𝜇𝑦
)︀2
2𝜎2𝑦
)︃
, for all [0,∞).
Our results are robust with other values of parameters or other types of distributions for both 𝜂 and 𝑦
such as truncated normal distributions, truncated exponential distributions, etc.
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Figure 6. Comparative statics. This figure depicts the impact of a reduction in
arbitrage capital on the circulation rate of the marketable asset (the x-axis is scaled as
the percentage of ?¯?𝐴).
on the circulation rate of the high-quality asset given different distributions of 𝑦 (the
return on the non-marketable asset).23 When the non-marketable asset is less profitable
(𝑦 is on average lower), the seller is more likely to liquidate the non-marketable asset
instead of selling the high-quality asset. Therefore, there is more adverse selection with
lower 𝑦 (notice that the circulation rate falls down much faster when 𝑦 is on average
lower). The adverse selection problem is costly for the seller with the high-quality asset
because it causes inefficient liquidation of the otherwise valuable non-marketable asset.
Therefore, the circulation rate of the high-quality asset, 𝜇𝐻 , reflects how easily the seller
can raise liquidity by selling the asset in the market. That is, 𝜇𝐻 proxies for the degree
of liquidity in the market. By comparison to the classical informed trading literature
(such as Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) and Kyle (1985)), our model contributes to the
literature by suggesting an alternative mechanism that can create market illiquidity. It
suggests that reductions in funding liquidity can decrease market liquidity through the
lemons problem.
Figure 7 illustrates the impact of a reduction in arbitrage capital on the expected
price of the high-quality asset under different parameter values the probability of being
high quality, 𝜌, and the payoff of the marketable asset in the low state, 𝜃𝐿. In the left
23In the right panel of Figure 6, the value of location parameter 𝜇𝑦 for random variable 𝑦 is given by
−3,−5,−7, which yields the mean of 𝑦 equal to 0.25, 0.03, 0.005, respectively.
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Figure 7. Comparative statics. This figure depicts the impact of a reduction in
arbitrage capital on the expected price of the high-quality asset under various levels of
parameter values (the x-axis is scaled as the percentage of ?¯?𝐴).
panel of Figure 7, the fire sale discount increases faster when the marketable asset is
more likely to be of low quality (i.e., 𝜌 is lower). In case of fixed income securities, we
can interpret that speculative-grade securities are more vulnerable to fire sales under
small reductions in arbitrage capital. Notice, however, that fire sales eventually occur
even for those assets with higher 𝜌 (or investment-grade securities) as arbitrage capital
decreases further. In the right panel of Figure 7, the fire sale discount increases faster
when the payoff of the low-quality asset is on average lower (i.e., 𝜃𝐿 is lower). In case of
fixed income securities, we can interpret that securities with smaller recovery value are
more vulnerable to fire sales under small reductions in arbitrage capital.
B. Welfare Analysis
Because the marketable asset merely changes hands through trades, changes in welfare
only arise from (i) allocations between the non-marketable assets and the risk-free asset,
and (ii) sharing the risk of hedgers’ wealth shocks. Recall that the non-marketable assets
are ex-ante operating at an optimal level in the absence of liquidity constraints, so liqui-
dation destroys value. Therefore, expected total wealth is maximized when liquidation
of the non-marketable assets is minimized.24 On the risk sharing side, the hedgers are
24Mispricing caused by fire sales creates incentives to sacrifice the efficiency of investment. Then,
those in liquidity shortage are forced to liquidate otherwise profitable non-marketable assets (even
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risk-averse, thus, they want to eliminate any unwanted risk exposure as long as they
have trading opportunities. Because market freezes prevent risk sharing, the hedgers
are worse off when less arbitrage capital is around. However, there is some subtlety
in the hedgers’ expected utility: they may sometimes be better off with noisy prices
due to the Hirshleifer (1971) effect. They are unable to insure against risk whose re-
alizations are already reflected in prices (see, for example, Dow and Rahi (2000) for a
further discussion). Such offsetting effects are dominated when the residual uncertainty
of the marketable asset is large enough. Therefore, the hedgers’ expected utility is also
maximized with more informed arbitrage capital under such a condition.
We can show that the component of expected total wealth that is relevant to 𝑤𝐴 is
given by
𝑊 ≡
[︂
𝜌
(︂
𝐸
[︁
𝑦
⃒⃒⃒
𝑦 ≥ 𝜃𝐻
𝐸[𝑝|𝜃𝐻 ] − 1
]︁
− 𝑟𝑓
)︂
𝐸[𝑝|𝜃𝐻 ] + (1− 𝜌)
(︀
𝐸[𝑦]− 𝑟𝑓
)︀
𝐸[𝑝|𝜃𝐿]
]︂
?¯?,
whose derivation is provided in the appendix. Notice that 𝑊 represents the economic
surplus created by the non-marketable asset, which may be destroyed in case of its
liquidation. For risk sharing, we use the expected utility of the hedgers, which is given
by
𝑈𝐻 ≡
∫︁
ℎ∈ℋ
𝐸
[︂
exp
(︁
−𝛾[︀(𝑣 − 𝑝(1 + 𝑟𝑓 ))𝑥ℎ + 𝑣𝑧ℎ]︀)︁]︂𝑑ℎ.
In line with Proposition 2, we find that the presence of enough arbitrage capital
maximizes economic welfare by preventing fire sales and market freezes.25
PROPOSITION 3: (i) (Expected total wealth) 𝑊 is maximized when 𝑤𝐴 ≥ ?¯?𝐴. (ii)
(Risk sharing) 𝑈𝐻 is maximized when 𝑤𝐴 ≥ ?¯?𝐴 for sufficiently large 𝜖 under the condi-
tion that 𝑓𝜂(·) is bounded away from zero on its support.
Proof: See Appendix B. Q.E.D.
when they can improve firm value by further increasing investment in non-marketable assets). For
example, Ivashina and Scharfstein (2010) find that bank lending decreased significantly after the onset
of the financial crisis.
25The condition that 𝑓𝜂(·) is strictly positive on the support [0, 1] is a technical condition needed due
to the Hirshleifer effect. The condition is stronger than necessary. It ensures that the possibility of
hedgers having profits does not become unboundedly large relative to that of having losses at any level
of arbitrage capital.
29
Proposition 3.(i) implies expected total wealth decreases with more mispricing due
to misallocated resources. Figure 8 illustrates this with numerical examples.26 The
results show that negative spillover effects to expected total wealth are larger (a) when
liquidating the non-marketable asset is less likely costly (𝐸[𝑦] is lower), and (b) when
the payoff of a low-quality asset is smaller (𝜃𝐿 is lower). Similarly, Proposition 3.(ii)
implies the hedgers’ expected utility decreases with more mispricing due to reduced risk
sharing opportunities. The figures demonstrate that negative spillover effects to risk
sharing are larger (c) when the hedgers are more risk-averse (𝛾 is higher), and (d) when
the residual uncertainty of the marketable asset is higher (𝜖 is greater).
V. Extension: Endogenous Margin Constraints
In this section, we extend our baseline model by endogenizing margin constraints. Al-
though margin constraints can be endogenized in various ways, we choose one of the
simplest ways of doing it without introducing new frictions such as transaction costs,
moral hazard, or other additional information asymmetries.27 The purpose of our exer-
cise here is (i) to show that our results are robust with endogenous margin constraints,
and (ii) to further explore the implications of our baseline model related to endogenous
margin constraints.
We consider the case where constrained margin traders (i.e., arbitrageurs) get margin
loans from unconstrained participants in the economy (i.e., hedgers and investors). For
analytical simplicity, we assume that margins loans are risk-free; margin constraints
are endogenously determined so that margin loans offer the same rate of return as the
risk-free rate to both lenders and borrowers.28 The initial margin, which is the capital
pledged by a margin trader as collateral, should be sufficient to cover any loss caused by
his margin trading in every possible state of the world.29 That is, the trader’s pledged
26The measure of total expected wealth is positive, whereas the measure of risk sharing (the expected
utility of hedgers) is negative. Therefore, the normalized maximum of total expected wealth is equal to
one, and the normalized maximum of risk sharing measure is equal to minus one.
27For example, Biais, Heider, and Hoerova (2016) endogenize margin constraints by introducing moral
hazard of neglecting risk management by trading counterparties. They show that moral hazard can
limit risk sharing, but margin calls can mitigate it, therefore, enhance risk sharing.
28In case margin loans are risky, the interest rate charged on margin loans will reflect the risk of its
default. We consider the risk-free loan for technical simplicity, but also to avoid confounding effects
arising from the default.
29Therefore, lenders provide margin loans to any market participant as long as one can pledge some
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Figure 8. Comparative statics. This figure depicts the impact of a reduction in
arbitrage capital on the economic welfare under various levels of parameter values (the
x-axis is scaled as the percentage of ?¯?𝐴, and the y-axis is scaled as the fraction of the
maximum level of the economic welfare measures).
margin should be larger than his maximum possible loss due to low (high) payoffs of the
marketable asset in case of long (short) positions. We further assume that capital in
the margin account grows at the risk-free rate; If an arbitrageur keeps 𝑤𝐴 of his capital
in his margin account, it grows to (1 + 𝑟𝑓 )𝑤𝐴 at 𝑡 = 2. Other than the setup involving
capital as the initial margin whether the participant possess expertise on the marketable asset or not.
Alternatively, we can assume that lenders know whether the borrower possesses expertise or not. With
that setup, we would also need to assume that 𝜖 > 𝜃𝐻 − 𝜃𝐿 to generate risk of losing money even when
they are informed about the quality of the marketable asset. This will simply relax margin constraints
further by reducing the potential loss that informed margin traders can suffer, but will not affect our
results in any other qualitative way.
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margin constraints, we keep all other assumptions the same as in our baseline model.
We can show that margins are endogenously determined given the price 𝑝 as follows:
LEMMA 5: Given the price 𝑝, the long and short margins 𝑚+,𝑚− are determined to be
𝑚+ = 𝑝− 𝜃𝐿 − 𝜖
1 + 𝑟𝑓
;
𝑚− =
𝜃𝐻 + 𝜖
1 + 𝑟𝑓
− 𝑝.
(12)
Proof: See Appendix. Q.E.D.
Notice that margin traders are allowed greater margin trading capacity to buy assets
as prices fall, and to short assets as prices rise. The intuition is that potential loss from
a long (short) position becomes small when prices are already low (high). Furthermore,
equation (12) reveals that such an increase in margin trading capacity will accelerate
as prices approach either the lowest or the highest possible values (i.e., 𝜃𝐿
1+𝑟𝑓
and 𝜃𝐻
1+𝑟𝑓
).
Then, arbitrage trading variation, Δ𝑋, given 𝑝 is represented as
Δ𝑋 ≡ 𝑤𝐴
𝑚+
+
𝑤𝐴
𝑚−
=
𝑤𝐴
𝑝− 𝜃𝐿−𝜖
1+𝑟𝑓
+
𝑤𝐴
𝜃𝐻+𝜖
1+𝑟𝑓
− 𝑝.
It is easy to verify that Δ𝑋 has an inverse hump-shaped relationship with 𝑝 (i.e., it is
maximized at either corner of the interval of 𝑝 ∈ [ 𝜃𝐿
1+𝑟𝑓
, 𝜃𝐻
1+𝑟𝑓
], but is minimized in the
middle of the interval). This implies that an increase in mispricing will reinforce itself
by reducing trading capacity as prices start moving away from the true fundamental.
The endogenous margin constraint is the source of such a feedback effect, but it does not
qualitatively change our results in other ways. Moreover, all our previous results under
the exogenous margin constraint in our baseline model are even further pronounced
under the endogenous margin constraint (in other words, the magnitude of fire sales
under the endogenous margin constraint is even greater than that under the exogenous
margin constraint given the same percentage of reduction in arbitrage capital from the
fire-sale-free level assuming all other things equal).
The rest of analysis under the endogenous margin constraint is identical to that
of our baseline model, and we can further show that a model with the endogenous
margin constraint becomes equivalent to those with the exogenous margin as the residual
uncertainty becomes larger.
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PROPOSITION 4: As 𝜖 becomes sufficiently large, prices of the marketable asset under
the endogenous margin constraint and the exogenous margin constraint become asymp-
totically identical given any percentage decrease from the corresponding fire-sale-free level
of arbitrage capital.
Proof: See Appendix. Q.E.D.
Proposition 4 implies any equilibrium property or comparative statics (e.g., quality
of traded assets and welfare of participants) with respect to all the parameters of our
model will also become identical regardless of assumptions on margin constraints as
the residual uncertainty becomes large enough. Therefore, a setup with the exogenous
margin constraint can be understood as the limit case of a setup with the endogenous
margin constraint. Figure 9 confirms these observations using numerical examples with
various parameter values of the residual uncertainty.
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Figure 9. Comparative statics. This figure depicts the impact of a reduction in
arbitrage capital on the expected price of the high-quality asset and the average quality
of the traded asset under various assumptions on the margin constraint (the x-axis is
scaled as the percentage of ?¯?𝐴).
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VI. Discussion
A. Financial Fragility and Policy Implications
We have shown that arbitrage capital can minimize mispricing and promote liquidity.
It is worth stressing that arbitrageurs do not have to absorb the majority of the supply
from the seller in our model. On the contrary, the uninformed investors absorb the
major share of the supply of the risky asset whereas the arbitrageurs simply play a
supporting role of setting the price close to the fundamental value. The role of arbitrage
capital is, however, crucial because the investors absorb the supply due to the presence
of arbitrage capital. A moderate amount of arbitrage capital is enough to make the
market efficient and stable. We draw the conclusion that informed capital facilitates the
movement of uninformed capital from the markets with excessive liquidity to those with
lack of liquidity.
In our model, marketable assets can be traded without fire sales even with an ar-
bitrarily large supply ?¯? as long as arbitrage capital is enough to offset the effect of
hedgers’ wealth shock. The reason is that the uninformed investors with deep pock-
ets (or high liquidity) are willing to absorb any amount of supply at the fair value as
long as prices are set correctly by informed arbitrageurs.30 In other words, even a small
amount of informed capital can make the price efficient. Therefore, arbitrage capital cre-
ates information spillover effects in the market that multiplies its price-setting ability;
the revelation of private information through prices makes otherwise-uninformed capital
work like informed capital.
This efficiency of arbitrage capital may seem advantageous for financial stability,
but it is in fact a double-edge sword. The potency of a small amount of arbitrage
capital may actually be the reason for financial fragility because it means prices will be
sensitive to a reduction of arbitrage capital. That is, small capital shocks to arbitrageurs
in the market can trigger fire sales and market freezes by driving away the demand of
uninformed investors. Indeed, as we have seen in Figure 5, small shocks to arbitrage
capital create fire sales by exacerbating lemons problems in the market. Notice that
in the figure, large drops in prices are triggered by small changes in arbitrage holdings
30If the investors are risk-averse, they would require risk premium for holding a larger amount of
risky assets. But, they would be willing to absorb more volume with uncertainty resolved by informed
arbitrageurs, so, the effect of risk aversion would be relatively small in this argument.
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(relative to total holdings). The “multiplier” effects of arbitrage capital can actually
serve as the source of financial instability rather than financial stability.
Fire sales and market freezes create negative externalities and distort resource allo-
cations. Our paper highlights the value of arbitrage capital in facilitating the efficient
functioning of markets. This has policy implications for capital adequacy regulation.
Recent papers such as Mitchell, Pedersen, and Pulvino (2007) and Duffie (2010) sug-
gest that institutional impediments such as such as search frictions, taxes, regulations,
and market segmentation can slow down the speed of arbitrage capital, thereby creating
fire sales and market freezes during market stress. But isn’t there anybody who can
try to arbitrage away obvious mispricing? A very few markets are truly closed to out-
siders by regulatory fiat (writing insurance is an example) but most markets are open
to investors who want to participate. Our results suggest an explanation for the under-
lying assumption of “slow-moving capital”; the presence of sufficient informed capital
can facilitate movement of uninformed capital during normal times, but the market can
quickly become illiquid if informed capital providers are liquidity constrained, as the
resulting lemons problem prevents entry of uninformed capital. Indeed, recent empirical
evidence seems to support our explanations. For example, Huang, Ringgenberg, and
Zhang (2016) find that mutual fund fire sales, which are caused by a flow shock, create
price pressure because fund managers choose to sell low-quality stocks. The resulting
lemons problem depresses asset prices for a prolonged period of time due to unresolved
information asymmetries.
Since the financial crisis, there has been an extensive debate about how to prevent
fire sales because they can lead to negative welfare consequences in the economy (e.g.,
Shleifer and Vishny (2011), Tirole (2011)). The suggested remedies for fire sales can
be usually categorized into two types. One is an ex-ante approach that reduces the
possibility of fire sales (e.g., Krishnamurthy (2010), Diamond and Rajan (2011), Perotti
and Suarez (2011)), and the other is an ex-post approach that mitigates the magnitude of
fire sales and the following adverse effects (e.g., Shleifer and Vishny (2010), Diamond and
Rajan (2011), Tirole (2012), Guerrieri and Shimer (2014)). Our theory has implications
for both ex-ante and ex-post measures against fire sales.
On the ex-post side, our results imply that asset purchase programs may not be
effective if asset purchase programs merely aim to reduce the net supply of assets sold
in fire sales. Asset purchase programs might be effective if fire sales were caused simply
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by cash-in-the-market pricing that does not involve information asymmetries. However,
they will not be effective if fire sales are caused by lemons problems in the market because
reducing asset supply in itself does not improve price informativeness.31 Therefore,
uninformed capital would not move into the market in fire sales simply because of an asset
purchase program. On the other hand, extending liquidity to arbitrageurs can improve
price informativeness, thereby restoring the price mechanism that allows uninformed
capital to participate in the market. Of course, incentive problems should be properly
addressed because financial institutions that receive liquidity support may have very
different objectives from the government agency that provides liquidity to them.
On the ex-ante side, our results imply that regulations on arbitrageurs such as capital
requirements may or may not achieve desired effects of stabilizing the market. We have
argued that lemons problems are endogenously determined by the availability arbitrage
capital, and that they have an intrinsic vulnerability to shocks. In Section IV, we showed
that enough arbitrage capital will prevent fire sales, but that arbitrageurs do not have
incentives to provide enough capital because they do not internalize negative spillover
effects. In that sense, requiring financial institutions to keep enough capital for potential
crisis could have a direct effect of lowering the frequency of fire sales. However, such
tightening of capital requirements would lower the return on arbitrage capital. One
might consider that in practice, this could have negative indirect effects, for example by
inducing arbitrageurs to exit entirely.32
B. Interpretation of the Financial Crisis of 2007-2008
In this section, we discuss the recent financial crisis in the light of our results in this
paper, and find some implications on the policy or regulations. The recent financial crisis
is often viewed as a consequence of the collapse of the housing bubble that grew through
the 2000s. Along with real estate, other assets and securities were also overvalued.
The aftermath of the collapse during 2007-2008 induced many financial institutions to
unwind their positions as well as to reduce their leverage. This process created liquidity
31In Tirole (2012), asset purchase programs can still be effective in the presence of a lemons problem
if the government is able to “clean up” the market by removing low-quality assets.
32For example, capital may flow to unregulated sectors such as non-bank financial intermediaries
rather than to regulated sectors. Therefore, fire sales would not be eliminated even with tightened capital
requirements because capital is costly. The argument that a fire-sale-free equilibrium is impossible is
parallel with the argument in Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) who find that informationally-efficient
markets are not possible in equilibrium if information acquisition is costly.
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shortage among leveraged institutions, thus created further illiquidity spillover effects in
other markets. There was market freeze across a large class of assets in particular for
structured financial products.33
Gorton and Metrick (2012) document that banks suffered liquidity shortage during
the financial crisis. They further find that relatively small amount of subprime risk lead
to spread rises of unrelated asset classes. Our theory suggests a reduction in informed
trading can act as a transmission mechanism of liquidity shocks to unrelated asset classes.
During the onset of the recent financial crisis, there was a liquidity crunch among the
financial institutions as a result of downturn in housing markets (and subsequent price
falls in structured products on housing mortgages). The liquidity constraints affected the
arbitrage trading variation of financial institutions which are likely to be more informed
about many securities they were trading. Merrill, Nadauld, Stulz, and Sherlund (2014)
find evidence about fire sales of RMBS in the aftermath of the subprime crisis.
In our model, the seller decides whether to bring their endowment of the marketable
asset to the market or not. Bringing the asset to the market can be interpreted as
trading the asset in the market, but it can be also alternatively interpreted as creating
the asset. Vickery and Wright (2013) document that issuance of non-agency RMBS
(or private-label RMBS) decreased significantly relative to agency RMBS since mid-
2007 and, during this period, secondary markets for trading non-agency RMBS were
extremely illiquid. Non-agency RMBS are less regulated and tend to include riskier
underlying loans (i.e., subprime mortgages) relative to agency RMBS, thus, they are
more subject to information asymmetries than agency RMBS. Our theory can explain
why there was a collapse of non-agency RMBS market during the recent crisis.
VII. Conclusions
In our paper, we have developed an information-based theory of fire sales using a noisy
REE framework with endogenous lemons problem. Our model combines limits to ar-
bitrage and adverse selection to provide a plausible mechanism of financial fire sales
and market freezes. In a situation when informed market participants are not highly
liquidity-constrained, arbitrage activity is high and prices are informative. This allows
uninformed investors to absorb the supply of assets without worrying about adverse
33See, for example, Brunnermeier (2009).
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selection. Therefore, arbitrage capital can “multiply” itself by making uninformed cap-
ital effectively function as informed capital in normal market. When arbitrageurs are
liquidity-constrained, however, arbitrage activity is reduced and prices become less infor-
mative. This creates an adverse selection problem, increasing the supply of low-quality
assets. This lemons problem makes well-capitalized uninformed market participants un-
willing to supply capital to support the price, thereby freezing the market. This can
explain the “double whammy” in which fire sales and market freezes occur together.
Our results shed light on the paradoxical nature of fire sales in which capital moves
out of the market when it is needed most and apparently would earn higher returns.
Furthermore, our results show how a financial fire sale can reduce economic welfare by
reducing expected total wealth as well as risk sharing.
The model has implications for financial fragility. Only a small amount of arbitrage
capital is required to make the market work efficiently because, so long as it ensures assets
are priced efficiently, this can facilitate the movement of uninformed capital. However,
this is a double-edge sword because a small reduction in arbitrage capital can create
a lemons problem and slow down the movement of uninformed capital, causing a fire
sale. Therefore, the multiplier effect of arbitrage capital can also serve as the source of
financial instability rather than financial stability.
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Appendix A. List of symbols
𝑣 payoff of marketable asset
𝜃 observable component of 𝑣 where 𝜃 ∈ {𝜃𝐻 , 𝜃𝐿}
𝜖 unobservable component of 𝑣 where 𝜖 ∈ {𝜖,−𝜖}
𝜌 probability that marketable asset pays 𝜃𝐻
?¯? seller’s endowment of marketable asset
𝑙 seller’s liquidity shortage
𝑟𝑓 risk-free rate
𝑦 return on non-marketable asset
𝑤𝐴 liquidity position of arbitrageur
?¯?𝐴 fire-sale-free level of arbitrage capital
𝑚+ dollar margin on arbitrageur’s long position
𝑚− dollar margin on arbitrageur’s short position
𝛾 risk aversion parameter of hedger
𝜂 portion of hedgers who are affected by random wealth shock
𝑥𝑎 arbitrageur 𝑎 ∈ 𝒜’s order flow where 𝒜 is the set of arbitrageurs
𝑥ℎ hedger ℎ ∈ ℋ’s order flow where ℋ is the set of hedgers
𝑧ℎ hedger ℎ ∈ ℋ’s wealth shock where 𝑧ℎ ∈ {0,−𝑧}
𝑥𝑠 seller’s supply of marketable asset
𝑋𝐴 arbitrageurs’ aggregate order flow where 𝑋𝐴 ≡
∫︀
𝑥𝑎∈𝒜 𝑥
𝑎𝑑𝑎
𝑋𝐻 hedgers’ aggregate order flow where 𝑋𝐻 ≡
∫︀
𝑥ℎ∈ℋ 𝑥
ℎ𝑑ℎ
𝑋 net supply of marketable asset where 𝑋 ≡ 𝑥𝑠 −𝑋𝐴 −𝑋𝐻
𝜉 sufficient statistic for 𝑋 where 𝜉 ≡ 𝑋𝐴 + 𝜂𝑧
Δ𝑋 arbitrage trading variation
𝜇𝐻 circulation rate of high-quality asset
𝜇𝐿 circulation rate of low-quality asset
𝜌 average quality of traded asset
𝑞 investors’ posterior belief that 𝜃 = 𝜃𝐻
𝑊 expected total wealth
𝑈𝐻 hedgers’ expected utility (or, measure of risk sharing)
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Appendix B.
Proof of Lemma 3: Each hedger ℎ ∈ ℋ maximizes his expected utility of future con-
sumption given price 𝑝 and wealth shock 𝑣𝑧ℎ:
max
𝑥ℎ
∑︁
𝜃∈{𝜃𝐻 ,𝜃𝐿}
∑︁
𝜖∈{𝜖,−𝜖}
(︁𝑃𝑟(𝜃|𝑝)
2
)︁
𝑢(𝑥ℎ, 𝑧ℎ; 𝜃, 𝜖),
where 𝑢(𝑥ℎ, 𝑧ℎ; 𝜃, 𝜖) denotes hedger ℎ’s utility with portfolio choice 𝑥ℎ given the realiza-
tions of 𝑧ℎ, 𝜃, 𝜖
𝑢(𝑥ℎ, 𝑧ℎ; 𝜃, 𝜖) = −1
𝛾
𝑒−𝛾[𝑤𝐻(1+𝑟𝑓 )+(𝜃+𝜖−𝑝(1+𝑟𝑓 ))𝑥
ℎ+(𝜃+𝜖)𝑧ℎ], (B.1)
and 𝑃𝑟(𝜃|𝑝) denotes the hedgers’ posterior belief that the quality of the traded asset is
𝜃 conditional on 𝑝.34
The first order condition is
−𝛾
∑︁
𝜃,𝜖
(︁𝑃𝑟(𝜃|𝑝)
2
)︁(︀
𝜃 + 𝜖− 𝑝(1 + 𝑟𝑓 )
)︀
𝑢(𝑥ℎ, 𝑧ℎ; 𝜃, 𝜖) = 0, (B.2)
and the second order condition is always satisfied:
𝛾2
∑︁
𝜃,𝜖
(︁𝑃𝑟(𝜃|𝑝)
2
)︁(︀
𝜃 + 𝜖− 𝑝(1 + 𝑟𝑓 )
)︀2
𝑢(𝑥ℎ, 𝑧ℎ; 𝜃, 𝜖) < 0.
Therefore, there exists a unique, interior, solution for this optimization problem.
By defining ?^?ℎ ≡ 𝑥ℎ + 𝑧ℎ, we can alternatively express equation (B.1) as
𝑢(𝑥ℎ, 𝑧ℎ; 𝜃, 𝜖) = 𝑒−𝛾𝑝(1+𝑟𝑓 )𝑧
ℎ
𝑢(?^?ℎ, 0; 𝜃, 𝜖),
so the optimization problem becomes
max
?^?ℎ
𝑒−𝛾𝑝(1+𝑟𝑓 )𝑧
ℎ
∑︁
𝜃,𝜖
(︁𝑃𝑟(𝜃|𝑝)
2
)︁
𝑢(?^?ℎ, 0; 𝜃, 𝜖). (B.3)
34Observing 𝑧ℎ does not help inferring the quality of the traded asset because each individual hedger
is infinitesimal and the total mass of affected hedgers, 𝜂, is random.
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This implies that solving for an optimization problem with wealth shock 𝑧ℎ is equivalent
to solving it without wealth shock (𝑧ℎ = 0), then, subtracting the size of the shock 𝑧ℎ
from the optimal solution ?^?ℎ,* that satisfies the following first-order condition for the
alternative optimization problem (B.3):
−𝛾𝑒−𝛾𝑝(1+𝑟𝑓 )𝑧ℎ
∑︁
𝜃,𝜖
(︁𝑃𝑟(𝜃|𝑝)
2
)︁(︀
𝜃 + 𝜖− 𝑝(1 + 𝑟𝑓 )
)︀
𝑢(?^?ℎ, 0; 𝜃, 𝜖) = 0. (B.4)
Notice that the left-hand side of equation (B.4) exceeds zero when ?^?ℎ is sufficiently
small and is strictly less than zero when ?^?ℎ is sufficiently large.35 Because the left-hand
side of equation (B.4) is monotone decreasing, there exists a unique solution 𝑋𝐶𝐴𝑅𝐴(𝑝)
for equation (B.4), which is a function of 𝑝 but is independent of 𝑧ℎ. Therefore, solving
equation (B.2) for 𝑥ℎ gives the optimal portfolio given 𝑝 and 𝑧ℎ as follows:
𝑥ℎ,* = 𝑋𝐶𝐴𝑅𝐴(𝑝)− 𝑧ℎ.
By aggregating each individual demand 𝑥ℎ across all hedgers in ℋ, we obtain the aggre-
gate demand of hedgers. Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 4: The investors observe the net supply 𝑋 = ?¯? − (𝑋𝐶𝐴𝑅𝐴(𝑝) + 𝜂𝑧) −
𝑋𝐴(𝜃), and use this to update their beliefs about 𝜃. Because ?¯? and 𝑋
𝐶𝐴𝑅𝐴(𝑝) are known
quantities for the investors, they can infer 𝜉 ≡ 𝑋𝐴(𝜃)+ 𝜂𝑧, which is a noisy signal about
𝜃. Using Bayes’ rule, the investors’ posterior beliefs that the traded asset is of high
quality can be derived as follows:
𝑞(𝜉) =
𝜌𝑓𝜂
(︀
(𝜉 −𝑋𝐴(𝜃𝐻))/𝑧
)︀
𝜌𝑓𝜂
(︀
(𝜉 −𝑋𝐴(𝜃𝐻))/𝑧
)︀
+ (1− 𝜌)𝑓𝜂
(︀
(𝜉 −𝑋𝐴(𝜃𝐿))/𝑧
)︀ . (B.5)
Now, suppose 𝜃 = 𝜃𝐻 . Then, we have 𝜉 = 𝑋𝐴(𝜃𝐻) + 𝜂𝑧. Equation (B.5) implies
𝑞(𝜉) =
𝜌𝑓𝜂(𝜂)
𝜌𝑓𝜂(𝜂) + (1− 𝜌)𝑓𝜂
(︀
𝜂 + (𝑋𝐴(𝜃𝐻)−𝑋𝐴(𝜃𝐿))/𝑧
)︀ . (B.6)
35Recall that 𝑝 in equation (3) is between 𝜃𝐿1+𝑟𝑓 and
𝜃𝐻
1+𝑟𝑓
due the risk-neutrality of the investors.
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Likewise, suppose 𝜃 = 𝜃𝐿. Then, we have 𝜉 = 𝑋𝐴(𝜃𝐿) + 𝜂𝑧. Equation (B.5) implies
𝑞(𝜉) =
𝜌𝑓𝜂
(︀
𝜂 − (𝑋𝐴(𝜃𝐻)−𝑋𝐴(𝜃𝐿))/𝑧
)︀
𝜌𝑓𝜂
(︀
𝜂 − (𝑋𝐴(𝜃𝐻)−𝑋𝐴(𝜃𝐿))/𝑧
)︀
+ (1− 𝜌)𝑓𝜂(𝜂)
. (B.7)
Substituting Δ𝑋 ≡ 𝑋𝐴(𝜃𝐻) − 𝑋𝐴(𝜃𝐿) into equations (B.6) and (B.7) completes the
proof. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 1: (i) (Existence of equilibrium) We prove existence of equilibrium
by construction in two steps. First, we fix the quality of the traded asset 𝜌 as given,
allowing us to solve for a unique price 𝑝 that clears the market at any given level of 𝜃
and 𝜂. Second, we show that there exists a solution for 𝜌 given the expected price 𝐸[𝑝|𝜃]
using the price function derived in the first step.
We start with the first step by fixing 𝜌. Because the investors are competitive and
risk-neutral, Lemma 4 implies that the equilibrium price given 𝜃 and 𝜂 should be uniquely
determined as follows:
𝑝(𝜃, 𝜂; 𝜌) =
1
1 + 𝑟𝑓
(︀
𝑞(𝜃, 𝜂; 𝜌)𝜃𝐻 + (1− 𝑞(𝜃, 𝜂; 𝜌))𝜃𝐿
)︀
,
where the weight 𝑞(𝜃, 𝜂; 𝜌) is defined by
𝑞(𝜃𝐻 , 𝜂; 𝜌) ≡ 𝜌𝑓𝜂(𝜂)
𝜌𝑓𝜂(𝜂) + (1− 𝜌)𝑓𝜂(𝜂 +Δ𝑋/𝑧) ; (B.8)
𝑞(𝜃𝐿, 𝜂; 𝜌) ≡ 𝜌𝑓𝜂(𝜂 −Δ𝑋/𝑧)
𝜌𝑓𝜂(𝜂 −Δ𝑋/𝑧) + (1− 𝜌)𝑓𝜂(𝜂) . (B.9)
Then, the expected price of the high-quality asset is given by
𝐸[𝑝(𝜃, 𝜂; 𝜌)|𝜃𝐻 ] = 1
1 + 𝑟𝑓
[︂
𝜃𝐿+(𝜃𝐻−𝜃𝐿)
(︁
1−𝐹𝜂(𝜂*)+
∫︁ 𝜂*
0
𝑞(𝜃𝐻 , 𝜂; 𝜌)𝑓𝜂(𝜂)𝑑𝜂
)︁]︂
, (B.10)
where
𝜂* ≡ max
(︁
1− Δ𝑋
𝑧
, 0
)︁
. (B.11)
Now, we turn to the second step that proves existence of the equilibrium supply from
the seller. From equations (4) and (7), in equilibrium the quality of the traded asset 𝜌
42
should satisfy:
𝜌 = 𝐻(𝜌), (B.12)
where
𝐻(𝜌) ≡
𝜌
(︀
1− 𝐹𝑦
(︀
𝜃𝐻
𝐸[𝑝(𝜃,𝜂;𝜌)|𝜃𝐻 ] − 1
)︀)︀
𝜌
(︀
1− 𝐹𝑦
(︀
𝜃𝐻
𝐸[𝑝(𝜃,𝜂;𝜌)|𝜃𝐻 ] − 1
)︀)︀
+ (1− 𝜌) .
Notice that equation (B.8) implies that 𝐸[𝑝(𝜃, 𝜂; 𝜌)|𝜃𝐻 ] = 𝜃𝐿1+𝑟𝑓 when 𝜌 = 0. There-
fore, we have
𝐻(0) =
𝜌
(︀
1− 𝐹𝑦
(︀
𝑟𝑓 +
(1+𝑟𝑓 )(𝜃𝐻−𝜃𝐿)
𝜃𝐿
)︀)︀
𝜌
(︀
1− 𝐹𝑦
(︀
𝑟𝑓 +
(1+𝑟𝑓 )(𝜃𝐻−𝜃𝐿)
𝜃𝐿
)︀)︀
+ (1− 𝜌)
> 0.
We can also easily verify that 𝐻(𝜌) ≤ 𝜌 using the definition of 𝐻(·). Because 𝐻(·) is
continuous in 𝜌, there must exist a fixed point solving equation (B.12) on the set (0, 𝜌].
(ii) (Uniqueness of equilibrium) To prove that the equilibrium is unique, it suffices to
show that 𝐻(·) has a single fixed point either in the interior (0, 𝜌) or at the corner 𝜌 = 𝜌.
We first prove the following lemma that will be used later:
LEMMA B.6: 𝐻(𝜌) monotone increases in 𝜌.
Proof: From equation (B.10), differentiating 𝐸[𝑝(𝜃, 𝜂; 𝜌)|𝜃𝐻 ] with respect to 𝜌 yields
𝜕𝐸[𝑝(𝜃, 𝜂; 𝜌)|𝜃𝐻 ]
𝜕𝜌
=
𝜃𝐻 − 𝜃𝐿
1 + 𝑟𝑓
∫︁ 𝜂*
0
𝜕𝑞(𝜃𝐻 , 𝜂; 𝜌)
𝜕𝜌
𝑓𝜂(𝜂)𝑑𝜂, (B.13)
where 𝜂* is the threshold of 𝜂 defined in equation (B.11). Notice that, for all 𝜂 ∈ [0, 𝜂*],
we have
𝜕𝑞
𝜕𝜌
=
𝑓𝜂(𝜂)𝑓𝜂(𝜂 +Δ𝑋/𝑧)(︀
𝜌𝑓𝜂(𝜂) + (1− 𝜌)𝑓𝜂(𝜂 +Δ𝑋/𝑧)
)︀2 > 0,
which implies that 𝜕𝐸[𝑝(𝜃,𝜂;𝜌)|𝜃𝐻 ]
𝜕𝜌
> 0. Thus, the following is immediate:
𝜕𝐻(𝜌)
𝜕𝜌
=
𝜌(1− 𝜌)𝑓𝑦
(︀
𝜃𝐻
𝐸[𝑝(𝜃,𝜂;𝜌)|𝜃𝐻 ] − 1
)︀[︀
𝜌
(︀
1− 𝐹𝑦
(︀
𝜃𝐻
𝐸[𝑝(𝜃,𝜂;𝜌)|𝜃𝐻 ] − 1
)︀)︀
+ (1− 𝜌)]︀2 𝜃𝐻𝐸[𝑝|𝜃𝐻 ]2 𝜕𝐸[𝑝|𝜃𝐻 ]𝜕𝜌 > 0.
Q.E.D.
Next, we show that there can exist only one fixed point that solves 𝐻(𝜌) = 𝜌 under
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the conditions provided in Proposition 1.(ii). Suppose that those conditions are true,
that is, (a) 𝐻 ′(𝜌) < 1 if 𝐻(𝜌) = 𝜌, and (b) 𝐻 ′′(𝜌) ≥ 0 for all 𝜌 ∈ [𝜌′, 𝜌] if 𝐻 ′′(𝜌′) > 0.
We first prove that there is no interior fixed point, if there exists a corner fixed point:
LEMMA B.7: Under conditions (a) and (b), if 𝐻(𝜌) = 𝜌, then, there is no 𝜌 ∈ (0, 𝜌)
such that 𝐻(𝜌) = 𝜌.
Proof: Assume that 𝐻(𝜌) = 𝜌 but there also exists at least one interior fixed point.
Let 𝜌* ∈ (0, 𝜌) be the smallest fixed point among those interior fixed points. Because
𝐻(0) > 0, Lemma B.6 implies 𝐻 ′(𝜌*) ∈ [0, 1) under conditions (a) and (b).36 Given
condition (b), there are two possibilities: either 𝐻(·) is concave throughout the interval
of [𝜌*, 𝜌], or becomes convex at some point on the interval. First, suppose that𝐻 ′′(𝜌) ≤ 0
for all 𝜌 ∈ [𝜌*, 𝜌]. Then, it implies 𝐻(𝜌) < 𝜌 for all 𝜌 ∈ (𝜌*, 𝜌] because 𝐻(𝜌*) = 𝜌* and
𝐻 ′(𝜌*) < 1. It contradicts with the assumption that 𝐻(𝜌) = 𝜌. Now, suppose that there
exists 𝜌 ∈ [𝜌*, 𝜌] such that 𝐻 ′′(𝜌) > 0 for all 𝜌 ∈ [𝜌, 𝜌]. But, condition (b) together with
𝐻(𝜌) = 𝜌 would then imply 𝐻 ′(𝜌) ≥ 1. This contradicts with condition (a). Therefore,
there cannot exist an interior fixed point if 𝐻(𝜌) = 𝜌. Q.E.D.
Now, we show that there can only be at most one interior fixed point:
LEMMA B.8: Under conditions (a) and (b), if there exist 𝜌*, 𝜌** ∈ (0, 𝜌) such that
𝐻(𝜌*) = 𝜌* and 𝐻(𝜌**) = 𝜌**, then, 𝜌* = 𝜌**.
Proof: Assume that 𝜌* ̸= 𝜌**. Let 𝜌* be the smaller one between the two, that is,
𝜌* < 𝜌**. As in the proof of Lemma B.7, the given conditions imply 𝐻 ′(𝜌*) ∈ [0, 1) with
two possibilities. First, suppose 𝐻 ′′(𝜌) ≤ 0 for all 𝜌 ∈ [𝜌*, 𝜌]. Then, it implies 𝐻(𝜌) < 𝜌
for all 𝜌 ∈ (𝜌*, 𝜌] because 𝐻(𝜌*) = 𝜌* and 𝐻 ′(𝜌*) < 1. It contradicts with the assumption
that 𝐻(𝜌**) = 𝜌** and 𝜌* < 𝜌**. Now, suppose that there exists 𝜌 ∈ [𝜌*, 𝜌] such that
𝐻 ′′(𝜌) > 0 for all 𝜌 ∈ [𝜌, 𝜌]. Then, it is clear that 𝜌 ∈ [𝜌*, 𝜌**) and𝐻 ′(𝜌**) > 1. Condition
(b) implies that 𝐻 ′(𝜌) > 1 for all 𝜌 ∈ [𝜌**, 𝜌], which in turn implies 𝐻(𝜌) > 𝜌. But, this
contradicts with 𝐻(𝜌) ≤ 𝜌. Therefore, it should be the case that 𝜌* = 𝜌**. Q.E.D.
Finally, Lemma B.7 and Lemma B.8 together imply that there cannot exist more
than one fixed points on the set (0, 𝜌]. Therefore, conditions (a) and (b) are sufficient
36Suppose 𝐻 ′(𝜌*) ≥ 1. Condition (b) implies that 𝐻 ′′(𝜌*) > 0 because 𝐻(0) > 0 and 𝐻(·) monotone
increases in 𝜌. Under condition (b), however, this in turn implies 𝐻 ′(𝜌) ≥ 1, which contradicts with
condition (a).
44
to ensure uniqueness of equilibrium. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 2: From equation (9), we can represent the expected price of the
high-quality asset given 𝑤𝐴 as follows:
𝐸[𝑝(𝜃, 𝜂; 𝜌)|𝜃𝐻 ] = 1
1 + 𝑟𝑓
[︂
𝜃𝐿+(𝜃𝐻−𝜃𝐿)
(︁
1−𝐹𝜂(𝜂*)+
∫︁ 𝜂*
0
𝑞(𝜃𝐻 , 𝜂; 𝜌)𝑓𝜂(𝜂)𝑑𝜂
)︁]︂
, (B.14)
where
𝜂* ≡ max
(︂
1− Δ𝑋
𝑧
, 0
)︂
= max
(︂
1− 𝑤𝐴
𝑧
(︁ 1
𝑚+
+
1
𝑚−
)︁
, 0
)︂
.
Notice that 𝑞(𝜃𝐻 , 𝜂; 𝜌) < 1 whenever 𝜂 < 𝜂
*.37 Therefore, equation (B.14) implies
that 𝐸[𝑝(𝜃, 𝜂; 𝜌)|𝜃𝐻 ] = 𝜃𝐻1+𝑟𝑓 if and only if 𝜂* = 0, or equivalently,
𝑤𝐴 ≥ ?¯?𝐴 ≡ 𝑧
(︂
𝑚+𝑚−
𝑚+ +𝑚−
)︂
.
Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 3: (i) (Expected total wealth): We can represent the ex-ante expec-
tation of the aggregate final wealth of each type of participants (in the order of seller,
arbitrageurs, hedgers, and investors) as follows:
𝑊 𝑆 ≡ 𝐸[︀𝑣(?¯?− 𝑥𝑠) + (1 + 𝑦)(𝑝𝑥𝑠 − 𝑙)]︀;
𝑊𝐴 ≡
∫︁
𝑎∈𝒜
𝐸
[︀
(𝑣 − 𝑝(1 + 𝑟𝑓 ))𝑥𝑎)
]︀
𝑑𝑎+ (1 + 𝑟𝑓 )𝑤𝐴;
𝑊𝐻 ≡
∫︁
ℎ∈ℋ
𝐸
[︀
(𝑣 − 𝑝(1 + 𝑟𝑓 ))𝑥ℎ + 𝑣𝑧ℎ
]︀
𝑑ℎ+ (1 + 𝑟𝑓 )𝑤𝐻 ;
𝑊 𝐼 ≡
∫︁
𝑖∈ℐ
𝐸
[︀
(𝑣 − 𝑝(1 + 𝑟𝑓 ))𝑥𝑖
]︀
𝑑𝑖+ (1 + 𝑟𝑓 )𝑤𝐼 .
where 𝑤𝐴, 𝑤𝐻 , 𝑤𝐼 denote the initial wealth of arbitrageurs, hedgers, and investors, re-
spectively. Let 𝑦* denote the threshold of 𝑦 above which the seller sells the high-quality
37From equation (10), it is easy to see that 𝑞(𝜃𝐻 , 𝜂; 𝜌) < 1 if and only if 𝜂+Δ𝑋/𝑧 < 1 (or equivalently,
𝜂 < 𝜂*).
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marketable asset, and below which he does not, that is,
𝑦* ≡ 𝜃𝐻
𝐸[𝑝(𝜃, 𝜂; 𝜌)|𝜃𝐻 ] − 1.
Summing up the ex-ante expected final wealth of all the participants gives us the ex-ante
expectation of the aggregate wealth in the economy, 𝐴𝑊 ≡ 𝑊 𝑆 +𝑊𝐴 +𝑊𝐻 +𝑊 𝐼 :38
𝐴𝑊 = 𝑊 +𝑊0, (B.15)
where
𝑊 ≡ ?¯?
[︁
𝜌𝜇𝐻𝐸[𝑝|𝜃𝐻 ]
(︀
𝐸[𝑦|𝑦 ≥ 𝑦*]− 𝑟𝑓
)︀
+ (1− 𝜌)𝐸[𝑝|𝜃𝐿]
(︀
𝐸[𝑦]− 𝑟𝑓
)︀]︁
;
𝑊0 ≡ 𝐸[𝑣]𝐸[𝜂]𝑧 − (1 + 𝐸[𝑦])𝑙 + (1 + 𝑟𝑓 )(𝑤𝐴 + 𝑤𝐻 + 𝑤𝐼).
The first term, 𝑊 , in equation (B.15) is used as a measure of expected total wealth
(or economic surplus) at the given level of arbitrage capital; it measures the ex-ante
expectation of extra wealth created by the non-marketable asset at the given level of
arbitrage capital 𝑤𝐴. It is because the way that expected wealth can increase is via less
frequent liquidation of the non-marketable asset, as represented in 𝑊 . The other term,
𝑊0, captures other components irrelevant to economic surplus such as reallocations of
the initial wealth.39
Let 𝑊 (𝑤𝐴) be a function of 𝑤𝐴 which is equal to 𝑊 given 𝑤𝐴 in equation (B.15).
For any 𝑤𝐴 ≥ ?¯?𝐴, there is no fire sale in any state of the world, thus, we have 𝑊 (𝑤𝐴) =
𝑊 (?¯?𝐴) where
𝑊 (?¯?𝐴) =
?¯?
1 + 𝑟𝑓
[︁
𝜌𝜃𝐻 + (1− 𝜌)𝜃𝐿
]︁(︀
𝐸[𝑦]− 𝑟𝑓
)︀
. (B.16)
38Recall that we have the following equation in equilibrium:
?¯? =
∫︁
𝑎∈𝒜
𝑥𝑎𝑑𝑎+
∫︁
ℎ∈ℋ
𝑥ℎ𝑑ℎ+
∫︁
𝑖∈ℐ
𝑥𝑖𝑑𝑖.
39There are redistributions, captured in the first two terms of 𝑊0, but their total does not change:
𝐸[𝑣]𝐸[𝜂]𝑧−(1+𝐸[𝑦])𝑙 is unaffected by 𝑤𝐴. We also exclude the last term of𝑊0, (1+𝑟𝑓 )(𝑤𝐴+𝑤𝐻+𝑤𝐼),
because it mechanically reflects the increase in wealth from the initial wealth - in other words, when
performing comparative statics on wealth creation caused by increasing 𝑤𝐴, we net off the wealth change
that results directly.
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Using equation (B.16), we can represent 𝑊 (?¯?𝐴) as
𝑊 (?¯?𝐴) =
𝜌𝜃𝐻 ?¯?
1 + 𝑟𝑓
[︁
(1− 𝜇𝐻)
(︀
𝐸[𝑦|𝑦 < 𝑦*]− 𝑟𝑓
)︀
+ 𝜇𝐻
(︀
𝐸[𝑦|𝑦 ≥ 𝑦*]− 𝑟𝑓
)︀]︁
+
(1− 𝜌)𝜃𝐿?¯?
1 + 𝑟𝑓
(︀
𝐸[𝑦]− 𝑟𝑓
)︀
=
𝜌𝜃𝐻 ?¯?
1 + 𝑟𝑓
[︁
(1− 𝜇𝐻)
(︀
𝐸[𝑦|𝑦 < 𝑦*]− 𝑟𝑓
)︀
+ 𝜇𝐻
(︀
𝐸[𝑦|𝑦 ≥ 𝑦*]− 𝐸[𝑦])︀]︁
+
?¯?
1 + 𝑟𝑓
[︁
𝜌𝜇𝐻𝜃𝐻 + (1− 𝜌)𝜃𝐿
]︁(︀
𝐸[𝑦]− 𝑟𝑓
)︀
.
For any 𝑤𝐴 < ?¯?𝐴, we can calculate the difference between 𝑊 (?¯?𝐴) and 𝑊 (𝑤𝐴) as
follows:
𝑊 (?¯?𝐴)−𝑊 (𝑤𝐴) = 𝐴0(𝑤𝐴) + 𝐴1(𝑤𝐴), (B.17)
where
𝐴0(𝑤𝐴) ≡ 𝜌(1− 𝜇𝐻)𝜃𝐻 ?¯?
1 + 𝑟𝑓
(︀
𝐸[𝑦|𝑦 < 𝑦*]− 𝑟𝑓
)︀
+ 𝜌𝜇𝐻 ?¯?
(︁ 𝜃𝐻
1 + 𝑟𝑓
− 𝐸[𝑝|𝜃𝐻 ]
)︁(︀
𝐸[𝑦|𝑦 ≥ 𝑦*]− 𝐸[𝑦])︀;
𝐴1(𝑤𝐴) ≡ ?¯?
[︁
𝜌𝜇𝐻
(︁ 𝜃𝐻
1 + 𝑟𝑓
− 𝐸[𝑝|𝜃𝐻 ]
)︁
+ (1− 𝜌)
(︁ 𝜃𝐿
1 + 𝑟𝑓
− 𝐸[𝑝|𝜃𝐿]
)︁]︁(︀
𝐸[𝑦]− 𝑟𝑓
)︀
.
In the following lemma, we show that the second term, 𝐴1(𝑤𝐴), is zero for any 𝑤𝐴.
LEMMA B.9: For any 𝑤𝐴, we have
𝜌𝜇𝐻
(︁ 𝜃𝐻
1 + 𝑟𝑓
− 𝐸[𝑝|𝜃𝐻 ]
)︁
+ (1− 𝜌)
(︁ 𝜃𝐿
1 + 𝑟𝑓
− 𝐸[𝑝|𝜃𝐿]
)︁
= 0. (B.18)
Proof: Equation (B.18) can be represented as
𝜌
∫︁ 1−Δ𝑋/𝑧
0
(1− 𝑞(𝜃𝐻 , 𝜂; 𝜌))𝑓𝜂(𝜂)𝑑𝜂 − (1− 𝜌)
∫︁ 1
Δ𝑋/𝑧
𝑞(𝜃𝐿, 𝜂; 𝜌)𝑓𝜂(𝜂)𝑑𝜂 = 0, (B.19)
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where
𝑞(𝜃𝐻 , 𝜂; 𝜌) =
𝜌𝑓𝜂(𝜂)
𝜌𝑓𝜂(𝜂) + (1− 𝜌)𝑓𝜂(𝜂 +Δ𝑋/𝑧) ;
𝑞(𝜃𝐿, 𝜂; 𝜌) =
𝜌𝑓𝜂(𝜂 −Δ𝑋/𝑧)
𝜌𝑓𝜂(𝜂 −Δ𝑋/𝑧) + (1− 𝜌)𝑓𝜂(𝜂) .
Using integration by substitution, we can again rewrite equation (B.19) as
𝜌
∫︁ 1−Δ𝑋/𝑧
0
[︁
(1− 𝑞(𝜃𝐻 , 𝜂; 𝜌))𝑓𝜂(𝜂)− (1− 𝜌)𝑞(𝜃𝐻 , 𝜂; 𝜌)𝑓𝜂(𝜂 +Δ𝑋/𝑧)
]︁
𝑑𝜂 = 0. (B.20)
Because 𝜌(1 − 𝑞(𝜃𝐻 , 𝜂; 𝜌))𝑓𝜂(𝜂) = (1 − 𝜌)𝑞(𝜃𝐻 , 𝜂; 𝜌)𝑓𝜂(𝜂 + Δ𝑋/𝑧), it is immediate that
equation (B.20) is true, which in turn implies that equation (B.19) is true. Q.E.D.
It is easy to check that the first term of equation (B.17), 𝐴0(𝑤𝐴), is positive if
𝑤𝐴 < ?¯?𝐴, and zero otherwise. Therefore, Lemma B.9 implies that 𝑊 (?¯?𝐴) is strictly
greater than 𝑊 (𝑤𝐴) when 𝑤𝐴 < ?¯?𝐴, and is equal to 𝑊 (𝑤𝐴) when 𝑤𝐴 ≥ ?¯?𝐴. Q.E.D.
(ii) (Risk sharing): For notational convenience, we set 𝑤𝐻 equal to zero without loss of
generality (because the hedgers’ maximization problem is unaffected by it). Given 𝑤𝐴,
the ex-ante expected utility of a hedger can be represented as
𝑈𝐻(𝑤𝐴) = −1
𝛾
[︂
1− 𝐸[𝜂] + 𝜌(1− 𝜇𝐻)𝐸[𝜂] exp
(︀
𝛾𝜃𝐻𝑧
)︀
ϒ
+ 𝜌𝜇𝐻
∫︁ 1
0
𝜂 exp
(︀
𝛾(1 + 𝑟𝑓 )𝑝(𝜃𝐻 , 𝜂; 𝜌)𝑧
)︀
𝑓𝜂(𝜂)𝑑𝜂
+ (1− 𝜌)
∫︁ 1
0
𝜂 exp
(︀
𝛾(1 + 𝑟𝑓 )𝑝(𝜃𝐿, 𝜂; 𝜌)𝑧
)︀
𝑓𝜂(𝜂)𝑑𝜂
]︂
,
where
ϒ ≡ 1
2
(︁
exp
(︀
𝛾𝜖𝑧
)︀
+ exp
(︀−𝛾𝜖𝑧)︀)︁.
For any 𝑤𝐴 ≥ ?¯?𝐴, there is no fire sale in any state of the world, thus, we have
𝑈𝐻(𝑤𝐴) = 𝑈
𝐻(?¯?𝐴) where
𝑈𝐻(?¯?𝐴) = −1
𝛾
[︂
1− 𝐸[𝜂] + 𝐸[𝜂]
(︁
𝜌 exp(𝛾𝜃𝐻𝑧) + (1− 𝜌) exp(𝛾𝜃𝐿𝑧)
)︁]︂
.
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We claim that 𝑈𝐻(?¯?𝐴) is the highest value which 𝑈
𝐻(𝑤𝐴) can take for any 𝑤𝐴 ∈ [0,∞).
We let Δ𝑈𝐻 be the difference between 𝑈𝐻(?¯?𝐴) and 𝑈
𝐻(𝑤𝐴), that is,
Δ𝑈𝐻(𝑤𝐴) ≡ 𝑈𝐻(?¯?𝐴)− 𝑈𝐻(𝑤𝐴) = 𝑈1(𝑤𝐴) + 𝑈2(𝑤𝐴), (B.21)
where
𝑈1(𝑤𝐴) ≡ −1
𝛾
𝜌(1− 𝜇𝐻)𝐸[𝜂] exp(𝛾𝜃𝐻𝑧)(1−ϒ);
𝑈2(𝑤𝐴) ≡ −1
𝛾
[︂
𝜌𝜇𝐻
∫︁ 1−Δ𝑋/𝑧
0
𝜂
(︁
exp(𝛾𝜃𝐻𝑧)− exp(𝛾(1 + 𝑟𝑓 )𝑝(𝜃𝐻 , 𝜂; 𝜌)𝑧)
)︁
𝑓𝜂(𝜂)𝑑𝜂
+ (1− 𝜌)
∫︁ 1
Δ𝑋/𝑧
𝜂
(︁
exp(𝛾𝜃𝐿𝑧)− exp(𝛾(1 + 𝑟𝑓 )𝑝(𝜃𝐿, 𝜂; 𝜌)𝑧)
)︁
𝑓𝜂(𝜂)𝑑𝜂
]︂
.
Then, the claim is proven if Δ𝑈𝐻(𝑤𝐴) > 0 for all 𝑤𝐴 < ?¯?𝐴.
LEMMA B.10:
lim
𝑤𝐴↑?¯?𝐴
𝑑𝐸[𝑝|𝜃𝐻 ]
𝑑𝑤𝐴
> 0.
Proof: Differentiating 𝐸[𝑝|𝜃𝐻 ] with respect to 𝑤𝐴 yields
𝑑𝐸[𝑝|𝜃𝐻 ]
𝑑𝑤𝐴
=
𝜕𝐸[𝑝|𝜃𝐻 ]
𝜕𝑤𝐴
+
𝜕𝐸[𝑝|𝜃𝐻 ]
𝜕𝜌
𝑑𝜌
𝑑𝑤𝐴
. (B.22)
From equation (B.13), we can easily verify that
lim
𝑤𝐴↑?¯?𝐴
𝜕𝐸[𝑝|𝜃𝐻 ]
𝜕𝑤𝐴
=
1
1 + 𝑟𝑓
(𝜃𝐻 − 𝜃𝐿)
(︀
1− 𝑞(𝜃𝐻 , 0; 𝜌)
)︀
𝑓𝜂(0)
(︂
𝑚+ +𝑚−
𝑚+𝑚−𝑧
)︂
> 0; (B.23)
lim
𝑤𝐴↑?¯?𝐴
𝜕𝐸[𝑝|𝜃𝐻 ]
𝜕𝜌
= 0. (B.24)
Furthermore, we can also verify that lim
𝑤𝐴↑?¯?𝐴
𝑑𝜌
𝑑𝑤𝐴
is finite. To see this, we let 𝐾(𝜌) ≡
𝐻(𝜌) − 𝜌.40 Then, it is clear that 𝐾(𝜌) = 0 if the economy is in equilibrium. By the
implicit function theorem, we have
𝑑𝜌
𝑑𝑤𝐴
= −
𝜕𝐾
𝜕𝑤𝐴
𝜕𝐾
𝜕𝜌
, (B.25)
40See equation (B.12) for the definition of 𝐻(·)
49
where
𝜕𝐾
𝜕𝑤𝐴
=
𝜌(1− 𝜌)𝑓𝑦
(︀
𝜃𝐻
𝐸[𝑝(𝜃,𝜂;𝜌)|𝜃𝐻 ] − 1
)︀[︀
𝜌
(︀
1− 𝐹𝑦
(︀
𝜃𝐻
𝐸[𝑝(𝜃,𝜂;𝜌)|𝜃𝐻 ] − 1
)︀)︀
+ (1− 𝜌)]︀2 𝜃𝐻𝐸[𝑝|𝜃𝐻 ]2 𝜕𝐸[𝑝|𝜃𝐻 ]𝜕𝑤𝐴 ;
𝜕𝐾
𝜕𝜌
=
𝜌(1− 𝜌)𝑓𝑦
(︀
𝜃𝐻
𝐸[𝑝(𝜃,𝜂;𝜌)|𝜃𝐻 ] − 1
)︀[︀
𝜌
(︀
1− 𝐹𝑦
(︀
𝜃𝐻
𝐸[𝑝(𝜃,𝜂;𝜌)|𝜃𝐻 ] − 1
)︀)︀
+ (1− 𝜌)]︀2 𝜃𝐻𝐸[𝑝|𝜃𝐻 ]2 𝜕𝐸[𝑝|𝜃𝐻 ]𝜕𝜌 − 1.
Using equations (B.23), (B.24) and (B.25), we can show that lim
𝑤𝐴↑?¯?𝐴
𝑑𝜌
𝑑𝑤𝐴
is finite and
positive. Then, the result is immediate from equation (B.22). Q.E.D.
In the following lemma, we prove that Δ𝑈𝐻(𝑤𝐴) is positive for any 𝑤𝐴 arbitrarily
close to ?¯?𝐴.
LEMMA B.11: There exists 𝑤𝐴 such that Δ𝑈
𝐻(𝑤𝐴) > 0 for all [𝑤𝐴, ?¯?𝐴).
Proof: Differentiating 𝑈1(𝑤𝐴) with respect to 𝑤𝐴 yields
𝑑𝑈1
𝑑𝑤𝐴
=
𝜌
𝛾
𝑑𝜇𝐻
𝑑𝑤𝐴
𝐸[𝜂] exp(𝛾𝜃𝐻𝑧)(1−ϒ),
where
𝑑𝜇𝐻
𝑑𝑤𝐴
= 𝑓𝑦
(︁ 𝜃𝐻
𝐸[𝑝(𝜃, 𝜂; 𝜌)|𝜃𝐻 ] − 1
)︁ 𝜃𝐻
𝐸[𝑝|𝜃𝐻 ]2
𝑑𝐸[𝑝|𝜃𝐻 ]
𝑑𝑤𝐴
.
Lemma B.10 implies lim
𝑤𝐴↑?¯?𝐴
𝑑𝜇𝐻
𝑑𝑤𝐴
> 0, which in turn implies lim
𝑤𝐴↑?¯?𝐴
𝑑𝑈1
𝑑𝑤𝐴
is strictly negative
because ϒ > 1. Similarly, it can also be shown that
lim
𝑤𝐴↑?¯?𝐴
𝑑𝑈2
𝑑𝑤𝐴
=
1− 𝜌
𝛾
(︂
𝑚+ +𝑚−
𝑚+𝑚−𝑧
)︂(︁
exp(𝛾𝜃𝐿𝑧)− exp(𝛾(1 + 𝑟𝑓 )𝑝(𝜃𝐿, 1; 𝜌)𝑧)
)︁
𝑓𝜂(1) < 0.
Therefore, Δ𝑈𝐻(𝑤𝐴) strictly decreases in 𝑤𝐴 arbitrarily close to ?¯?𝐴. Because Δ𝑈
𝐻(?¯?𝐴)
is equal to zero by construction, the continuity of Δ𝑈𝐻(·) implies it is positive for any
𝑤𝐴 arbitrarily close to ?¯?𝐴. Q.E.D.
From the definition of 𝑈2(𝑤𝐴) in equation (B.21), it is easy to see that 𝑈2(𝑤𝐴) is
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bounded below; for any 𝑤𝐴, we have
𝑈2(𝑤𝐴) ≥ −1
𝛾
𝜌𝐸[𝜂]
(︁
exp(𝛾𝜃𝐻𝑧)− exp(𝛾𝜃𝐿𝑧)
)︁
.
At any given level of 𝑤𝐴 < ?¯?𝐴, however, 𝑈1(𝑤𝐴) strictly increases in 𝜖 in an unbounded
manner. Therefore, there exists a constant 𝜖* such that, for any 𝜖 ≥ 𝜖*, Δ𝑈𝐻(𝑤𝐴)
is positive for all 𝑤𝐴 ≤ 𝑤𝐴. From Lemma B.11, Δ𝑈𝐻(𝑤𝐴) is also positive for any
𝑤𝐴 ∈ [𝑤𝐴, ?¯?𝐴). Consequently, given 𝜖 ≥ 𝜖*, Δ𝑈𝐻(𝑤𝐴) is zero only when 𝑤𝐴 ≥ ?¯?𝐴, and
positive otherwise. Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 5: We start with the long margin 𝑚+. Suppose arbitrageur 𝑎 (or any
margin trader) takes 𝑥𝑎,+ unit of long positions by pledging 𝑤𝐴 as the initial margin.
The maximum loss occurs when the marketable asset pays the lowest possible payoff,
𝜃𝐿− 𝜖. For the margin loan to be risk-free, the final balance for the arbitrageur’s margin
trading should be non-negative. It is because any loss should be covered by the initial
margin in that case. Given 𝑥𝑎,+, the final balance for arbitrageur 𝑎’s margin trading is
non-negative if and only if
(︀
𝜃𝐿 − 𝜖− 𝑝(1 + 𝑟𝑓 )
)︀
𝑥𝑎,+ + (1 + 𝑟𝑓 )𝑤𝐴 ≥ 0, (B.26)
where (𝜃𝐿 − 𝜖− 𝑝(1 + 𝑟𝑓 ))𝑥𝑎,+ is the maximum possible trading loss, and (1 + 𝑟𝑓 )𝑤𝐴 is
the capital in the margin account at 𝑡 = 2. When the arbitrageur chooses the maximum
possible long position (i.e., 𝑥𝑎,+ = 𝑤𝐴
𝑚+
) given his initial capital of 𝑤𝐴 and the long margin
of 𝑚+, equality holds in equation (B.26) as follows:
(︀
𝜃𝐿 − 𝜖− 𝑝(1 + 𝑟𝑓 )
)︀𝑤𝐴
𝑚+
+ (1 + 𝑟𝑓 )𝑤𝐴 = 0,
whose solution for 𝑚+ is given by
𝑚+ = 𝑝− 𝜃𝐿 − 𝜖
1 + 𝑟𝑓
.
Now, we turn to the short margin 𝑚−. Suppose arbitrageur 𝑎 takes 𝑥𝑎,− unit of
short positions by pledging 𝑤𝐴 as the initial margin. The maximum loss occurs when
the marketable asset pays the highest possible payoff, 𝜃𝐻 + 𝜖. Given 𝑥
𝑎,−, the final
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balance for arbitrageur 𝑎’s margin trading is non-negative if and only if
(︀
𝑝(1 + 𝑟𝑓 )− 𝜃𝐻 − 𝜖
)︀
𝑥𝑎,− + (1 + 𝑟𝑓 )𝑤𝐴 ≥ 0. (B.27)
Similarly as in the long margin, we can obtain the following using equation (B.27):
𝑚− =
𝜃𝐻 + 𝜖
1 + 𝑟𝑓
− 𝑝.
Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 4: We define ?¯?𝑒𝑛𝐴 to be the fire-sale-free level of arbitrage capital
under the endogenous margin constraint given residual uncertainty parameter 𝜖, and also
define ?¯?𝑒𝑥𝐴 to be the fire-sale-free level of arbitrage capital under the exogenous margin
constraint given margin parameters 𝑚+,𝑚−. Then, it is easy to show that
?¯?𝑒𝑛𝐴 =
(1 + 𝑟𝑓 )(𝜃𝐻 − 𝜃𝐿 + 𝜖)𝜖𝑧
𝜃𝐻 − 𝜃𝐿 + 2𝜖 ;
?¯?𝑒𝑥𝐴 = 𝑧
(︂
𝑚+𝑚−
𝑚+ +𝑚−
)︂
.
Let 𝛿 be the fraction of decrease in arbitrage capital from the fire-sale-free level, that
is, 𝛿 ≡ (?¯?𝐴−𝑤𝐴)/?¯?𝐴 for any 𝑤𝐴 ≤ ?¯?𝐴. When there is a 𝛿 fraction of decrease in arbitrage
capital, the arbitrage trading variation under the endogenous and the exogenous margin
constraint is, respectively, given by
Δ𝑋𝑒𝑛 = (1− 𝛿)𝑧
(︂
(𝜃𝐻 − 𝜃𝐿 + 𝜖)𝜖
(𝑞(𝜃𝐻 − 𝜃𝐿) + 𝜖)((1− 𝑞)(𝜃𝐻 − 𝜃𝐿) + 𝜖)
)︂
;
Δ𝑋𝑒𝑥 = (1− 𝛿)𝑧.
Notice that Δ𝑋𝑒𝑛 ≤ Δ𝑋𝑒𝑥, and also that Δ𝑋𝑒𝑛 → Δ𝑋𝑒𝑥 as 𝜖 → ∞. Due to
Proposition 1, the equilibrium prices under the endogenous and the exogenous margin
constraints should become asymptotically identical as their arbitrage trading variations
become arbitrarily close. This in turn implies that all the equilibrium quantities such as
the quality of traded asset, the circulation rate of the high-quality asset, etc should be
also arbitrarily close. Q.E.D.
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